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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, a specific class of dubious clinical practices has been labeled 
pseudoscientific and highlighted as a growing area of concern in psychology.  Experts 
have identified numerous examples of pseudoscientific treatments, which are troubling 
for various ethical reasons.  In light of the absence of research investigating the nature 
of professional beliefs and knowledge associated with scientifically substantiated and 
unsubstantiated clinical interventions, the primary objective of this study was to 
develop a questionnaire (viz., the Clinical Attitudes and Knowledge Questionnaire, or 
CAKQ) to appraise specific clinical knowledge domains and attitudes toward science 
among licensed, doctoral-level practitioners of clinical psychology.  This aim was 
pursued through generating items designed to detect the presence of knowledge 
pertaining to (a) legitimate and questionable treatment techniques used in 
contemporary clinical practice; (b) general clinical psychology research (e.g., 
controversies relevant to applied practice); and (c) clinical judgment and decision-
making procedures.  A preliminary scale consisting of items addressing practitioner 
attitudes toward science in clinical psychology was also created.  A secondary study 
aim was to ascertain whether psychologists’ professed knowledge varied in relation to 
years involved in clinical practice.  Two thousand randomly selected licensed 
psychologists in New England engaged in clinical practice were invited to participate 
in the study, and the final sample size was 324 participants.  Statistical analyses 
indicated that the initial hypotheses were partially supported.  The hypothesis that a 
four-component solution would best summarize the CAKQ data was not supported by 
principal components analysis results.  However, the hypothesized relationship 
  
 
between clinical knowledge and critical thinking skills was partially supported.  
Consistent with expectations, a lower reliance on intuitive thinking styles was 
associated with greater clinical knowledge.  Finally, the hypothesis that total number 
of years of clinical experience would not predict higher clinical knowledge scores was 
also upheld.  Study limitations and future research directions were discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Economist Alan Blinder (1987) eloquently argued that although having one’s 
heart in the right place, or “softheartedness,” was essential to guiding humane 
approaches to economic policies, a reticence to steer the development and 
implementation of such policies with well-informed critical thinking, or 
“hardheadedness,” may result in undesirable or even disastrous consequences.  
Likewise, in clinical psychology, effective practitioners should be capable of not only 
exhibiting warmth and empathy during therapeutic interactions with clients, but also 
be willing to keep strictly intuitive and emotionally-driven preferences at bay while 
scrutinizing the evidentiary value of assessments and treatments to be considered and 
implemented.  Unfortunately, “hardheaded” critical thinking appears to be 
underutilized (and possibly underappreciated) among a considerable percentage of 
practitioners within the field (see Gaudiano, Brown, & Miller, 2011; 2012; Sharp, 
Herbert, & Redding, 2008), which is concerning given the potentially baneful 
ramifications for vulnerable mental health clients. 
A possible consequence of tenuous critical thinking habits combined with 
insufficient familiarity with peer-reviewed research (although additional factors are 
likely involved) is the proliferation of suboptimal clinical approaches (Beyerstein, 
2001; Lilienfeld, Ruscio, & Lynn, 2008; Lohr, Fowler, & Lilienfeld, 2002, summer).  
A specific class of questionable clinical practices has been labeled pseudoscientific in 
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recent decades and highlighted as a special area of focus and concern in psychology 
(Lilienfeld et al., 2003; Pignotti & Thyer, 2009; Still & Dryden, 2004).  Despite 
difficulties formally defining pseudoscience, which is largely attributable to the 
complexities of the enduring demarcation problem in philosophy of science (Derksen, 
1993; Lakatos, 1974; Laudan, 1983; Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013; Resnik, 2000), there is 
some consensus on specific hallmarks or warning signs distinguishing pseudoscience 
from science.  These include: (a) a disproportionate focus on hypothesis confirmation 
at the expense of adequate testing and refutation; (b) attempts to shield the 
fundamental principles (or hard core) of a research program from falsification through 
an ongoing invocation of auxiliary hypotheses, which Lakatos (1970) termed a 
degenerative research program when taken to extremes; (c) evasion of the peer 
review process; (d) the use of obscurantist jargon to create a superficial veneer of 
scientific legitimacy; (e) a consistent lack of self-correction and subsequent stagnation 
of ideas; (f) shifting the burden of proof from claimants to skeptics (e.g., declaring that 
the onus lies squarely on the critics of an approach to adduce evidence against it); (g) 
an absence of specified conditions under which claims do not hold (i.e., the 
delineation of boundary conditions); (h) lack of connectivity with related areas of 
scientific knowledge; and (i) an overemphasis on personal anecdotes and testimonials 
to lend credence to claims (Bunge, 1984; Lilienfeld, 2005, September; Lilienfeld et al., 
2003; see also Ruscio, 2005).  Thus, pseudoscience can be conceptualized as 
“nonscience masquerading as genuine science” (Lilienfeld, 2010, p. 286) and often 
contains expansive or extraordinary claims that lack essential supportive evidence, 
contradict well-established scientific findings, and/or overstep the boundaries of 
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current scientific knowledge. 
Experts have identified numerous examples of pseudoscientific psychological 
treatments, which include (but certainly are not limited to), (a) power therapies, such 
as Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy and Thought 
Field Therapy (TFT) for treating symptoms of trauma (Devilly, 2005; Herbert et al., 
2000); (b) facilitated communication (FC) for the treatment of autism (Jacobson, 
Mulick, & Schwartz, 1995); (c) neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) for addressing a 
variety of psychological and emotional difficulties (Witkowski, 2012); (d) rebirthing 
therapy for alleviating supposed lingering psychological trauma attributable to one’s 
birthing experience (Singer & Lalich, 2008); (e) critical incident stress debriefing 
(CISD) for the early prevention of trauma symptoms (Devilly, Gist, & Cotton, 2006); 
(f) acupuncture for anxiety (Errington-Evans, 2012) and depression (Ernst, Lee, & 
Choi, 2011); (g) dolphin-assisted therapy (DAT), which involves swimming and 
interacting with captured dolphins, for treating developmental disabilities (Marino & 
Lilienfeld, 2007); and (h) hypnosis as a repressed memory recovery technique (Lynn, 
Loftus, & Lilienfeld, 2008).  In addition, a subset of assessment methods have been 
roundly criticized for possessing poor validity for various purported uses, such as 
graphology, or the measure of personality traits via handwriting analysis (Dazzi & 
Pedrabissi, 2009); and the Draw-A-Person Test (ter Laak, de Goede, Aleva, & van 
Rijswijk, 2005).   
Regardless of how we choose to categorize and label ineffective and/or 
potentially harmful clinical methods, which has been hotly debated in the 
psychological literature (see McNally, 2003, and multiple spirited responses in the 
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same issue), there appears to be overall agreement among scholars that such methods 
are concerning for various ethical reasons (e.g., the violation of general principles and 
specific standards of the American Psychological Association (APA) Ethics Code 
[2002], such as therapists taking care to do no harm and allowing research evidence to 
guide their practices).  From another perspective, the dissemination of ineffective 
clinical methodologies can be viewed as akin to a negative externality in economic 
terms.  That is, there are clear social, emotional, psychological, and financial costs 
when ineffective (or possibly harmful) interventions are provided to mental health 
consumers, but clinicians who regularly use them do not necessarily “pay” for these 
costs.  Rather, clinicians may reap financial profits from offering suboptimal services 
in place of effective ones, which ultimately subtract from (or, in some cases, 
endanger) client welfare.  Furthermore, certain clinicians may never be held 
accountable for damages inflicted upon their clients unless formal ethics complaints 
and/or legal charges are filed. 
Alongside ethical violations, the proliferation and perceived acceptance of 
pseudoscience in clinical psychology arguably contributes to unflattering images of 
the field as partially evidenced by a raft of controversial articles published in 2009 in 
high-quality scientific journals (e.g., Nature; “Psychology: A reality check,” 2009), 
well-regarded psychological journals (e.g., Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest; Mischel, 2009), and popular news magazines (e.g., Newsweek; Begley, 2009, 
October), many of which openly questioned the legitimacy of applied clinical practice.  
In the wake of these accusations, the APA responded not by encouraging further 
research on the veracity of such claims (e.g., by surveying practitioners on preferred 
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practices) or investigating negative perceptions of the field, but rather by calling for 
strategies designed to persuade skeptical scholars and the general public to view the 
field as worthy of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) status 
(APA, 2010, June).  The APA’s response arguably ignores and obscures a largely 
unfettered dissemination of questionable clinical activities while elevating the interests 
of the field and its members over the needs and psychological well-being of 
consumers of mental health services. 
Despite the flurry of political debates and heightened academic focus on 
distinguishing scientific from non-scientific clinical practices in recent years, 
relatively few research efforts have examined mental health practitioners’ relevant 
knowledge and attitudes, for example, knowledge about the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of certain clinical interventions and decision-making methods for 
specific purposes, knowledge of the general research literature relevant to applied 
practice, and attitudes toward scientific thinking in clinical work.  Obliquely related 
lines of questionnaire development (e.g., targeting anomalous beliefs inconsistent with 
scientific thinking) have almost exclusively emphasized assessing for and 
counteracting the presence of paranormal beliefs among undergraduate students; 
furthermore, such questionnaires understandably lack items tailored to clinical 
psychological practices (e.g., McLean & Miller, 2010; Morier & Keeports, 1994; 
Vyse, 1997; Wesp & Montgomery, 1998).  In fact, only three studies to date (viz., 
Gaudiano et al., 2011; 2012; Sharp et al., 2008) have directly examined clinicians’ 
perspectives on evidence-based and non-evidence-based practices, and these 
investigations were relatively narrow in scope (e.g., reported theoretical orientations 
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and circumscribed areas of suboptimal practices, such as TFT). 
An exhaustive review of clinical practices that arguably rest on pseudoscience 
exceeds the scope of the present work.  Many such reviews already exist in peer-
reviewed journals and book chapters (see previous citations, especially Lilienfeld et 
al., 2003, and Lilienfeld et al., 2008) and reflect the thoughtful scrutiny of recognized 
experts in this area of inquiry.  Instead, this dissertation attempted to address a current 
gap in the literature by using survey methodology to examine what practicing clinical 
psychologists report to know in the context of clinical practice.  Collected data were 
also analyzed for potential associations with pertinent cognitive/information 
processing variables.  The current study thus sought to redress the abovementioned 
shortcomings in the literature through a preliminary investigation of clinical 
knowledge profiles among licensed psychologists (e.g., knowledge of the updated 
treatment and clinical decision-making literature). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Clinical Science and Evidence-Based Interventions 
“What is this thing called science?”1  Numerous pithy characterizations of 
science abound in both popular culture and within the profession of clinical 
psychology.  Renowned physicist Richard Feynman (1985), for example, described 
scientific inquiry as a bending over backward to refute one’s own hypotheses.  In his 
oft-quoted Caltech commencement address, in which he discussed the critical missing 
elements of “Cargo Cult Science,” he stated, “It’s a kind of scientific integrity, a 
principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty—a kind of 
leaning over backwards” (Feynman, 1974, p. 11).  Astronomer and astrophysicist Carl 
Sagan is commonly known for attributing the essence of science to rigorous critical 
thinking as opposed to a body of knowledge (Sagan & Druyan, 1997).  The father of 
the scientist-practitioner model in clinical psychology, David Shakow (1976), echoed 
similar sentiments in championing critical thinking over blind faith in particular 
theories or wishful thinking about desired research outcomes.   
When describing the intellectual habits of his academic mentors at University 
of Minnesota, Paul Meehl (1993) acknowledged philosopher Bertrand Russell’s 
“dominant passion of the true scientist—the passion not to be fooled and not to fool 
anybody else” (p. 728).  He further noted that if clinical psychologists forego this 
passion and forget “the two searching questions of positivism: ‘What do you mean?  
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How do you know?’”, they become “little more than be-doctored, well-paid 
soothsayers” (Meehl, 1993, p. 728).  Some psychologists emphasize intellectual 
honesty combined with a strong resistance to allowing political correctness to 
influence knowledge, especially out of a desire to feel more “comfortable” about 
reality (e.g., Hunt, 1999) while others (e.g., Beyerstein, 1997; Lilienfeld, 2010, 2012) 
maintain that the scientific common ground among allied psychological disciplines 
and the “hard sciences” (e.g., physics and chemistry) includes protection against 
confirmation bias combined with a rigorous and conscientious ferreting out of 
erroneous beliefs and preconceptions. 
Despite the aptness and elegance with which luminaries from different fields of 
study have articulated certain core components of science, it would be impossible to 
summarize the multifaceted nature of science with a single sentence.  Indeed, entire 
books have been devoted to capturing the essence of science (e.g., Carey, 2011; 
Chalmers, 1999; Gauch, 2003; Schurz, 2014).  Virtually all such books agree that 
furthering our understanding of nature is made possible by a foundational 
characteristic of science that distinguishes it from other methods of truth seeking—the 
scientific method.  At its most basic level, the scientific method entails observation, 
testing, and explanation (Carey, 2011).  Summarized in more detail (albeit not 
exhaustively), this process may proceed as follows (cf. Box, Hunter, & Hunter, 1978; 
Gauch, 2003):  Seeking to discover the truth about a phenomenon of interest, a 
scientist first obtains existing information about the phenomenon (e.g., previous 
research and observations).  This information assists with shaping initial educated 
guesses about the phenomenon, which ultimately take on tightly defined and testable 
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hypotheses that subsequently steer the design and methodological features of the 
study.  Pre-established procedures guide the systematic collection of data, which 
contain truth about reality intermingled with noise (i.e., various kinds of error), the 
latter being diminished as much as possible via sound research design and 
conscientious scientific conduct.  Next, data bearing on the hypotheses are 
summarized and appropriately analyzed, and conclusions and inferences are carefully 
formulated with an eye toward observed results.  Finally, future research directions, 
study limitations, new hypotheses, and/or possible theoretical adjustments are 
submitted for consideration, and the entire study is summarized in written form to be 
peer reviewed by the scientific community.  If the study stands up to the critical 
scrutiny of other independent scientists and is replicated by additional investigators, 
the findings are added to the provisional corpus of scientific knowledge until further 
revised or later disconfirmed. 
An armamentarium of cognitive approaches and logical tools is put to use as 
the scientific method is applied.  This encompasses general problem solving skills, 
critical thinking, skepticism, inductive logic, deductive logic (or, perhaps more 
accurately in most practical contexts, abductive reasoning; Fann, 1970), eliminative 
parsimony, probabilistic thinking, falsification (i.e., attempts at hypothesis 
disconfirmation), relational reasoning, causal inference, and analogical reasoning 
(Dunbar & Fugelsang, 2005; Gauch, 2003).  Epistemologically, these modes of 
thinking are typically accompanied by a form of Peircean fallibilism (Peirce, 2011) in 
contemporary scientific inquiry, which acknowledges the influences of error and 
uncertainty in rendering knowledge provisional.  In line with fallibilist and 
 10 
 
probabilistic modes of thinking, inferences drawn in scientific psychology are tainted 
by layers of uncertainty and are thus subject to the dominion of probability theory 
(unlike pure mathematics and formal logic).  Because determinism in psychology is 
untenable, psychological theories cannot be sufficiently proved in the strong Euclidian 
sense (Meehl & MacCorquodale, 1991).  Rather, psychologists are tethered to more 
cautious and tentative articulations of research findings.  They can declare, for 
example, that theories are rendered “more likely” or “more credible” based upon the 
preponderance and comparative weighing of both confirmatory and disconfirming 
evidence, but declarations of formal proof are erroneous. 
Thus, a central objective of scientific research is to arrive at the best possible 
approximations of various aspects of reality (e.g., a correspondence theory of reality 
or semi-hemi-demi scientific realism; O’Connor, 1975; Irwin, 1988; Russell, 1912) 
using sound reasoning principles and methodological tools.  This epistemological 
clarification is especially important given that the pursuit of “absolute certainty” is 
futile “concerning questions of fact” (Peirce, 2011, p. 59).  However, scientists do 
their utmost to allow features of reality (versus strictly socio-cultural constructions of 
reality) to dictate the content of truth propositions (Boghossian, 2007).  In general 
terms, nature should ultimately control what scientists take to be “correct” answers 
about it (Irwin, 1988).  Thus, truth is conceptualized as an accurate representation of 
the state of nature insofar as the scientific method can elucidate, although the presence 
of error and tentativeness of conclusions about worldly phenomena should always be 
borne in mind. 
All of the aforementioned perspectives are compatible with scientific 
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skepticism, which is rooted in the acknowledgement of a complex world that is 
unlikely to be fully understood by bounded human understanding (Devilly & Lohr, 
2008, p. 107).  They are also congruent with Donald Campbell’s (1974) concept of 
“evolutionary epistemology” in science, or the ferreting out of erroneous claims over 
time via the scientific method in a manner akin to natural selection.  Ideally, 
psychological researchers consistently and conscientiously adhere to disciplined 
cognitive habits (i.e., following the scientific method and utilizing relevant critical 
thinking skills) when conducting treatment outcome research, and clinical 
practitioners ideally draw from the same cognitive toolkit when making important 
decisions about the care of mental health clients.  This perspective of scientifically 
informed researchers and practitioners is consistent with David Shakow’s original 
formulation of the scientist-practitioner model in clinical psychology (Baker & 
Benjamin, 2000; Cautin, 2008; Shakow, 1969). 
The scientist practitioner model.  The advent of the scientist-practitioner (or 
“Boulder”) training model occurred during the Boulder Conference on Graduate 
Education in Clinical Psychology in 1949 (Raimy, 1950).  Conference participants 
agreed that research-informed practice was critical to the maturation and survival of 
clinical psychology, and the doctor of philosophy (Ph.D.) degree was decreed the 
legitimate basis for professional licensure (Baker & Benjamin, 2000).  From the 
perspective of Boulder model proponents, practical clinical training must go hand-in-
hand with rigorous research training given that these professional activities mutually 
inform one another in important ways.  The ideal scientist-practitioner is thus someone 
who has the skills and knowledge base not only to make informed and responsible 
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decisions about clinical care (i.e., by being able to understand, evaluate, and 
selectively apply research findings), but also to produce and publish novel research to 
advance the field (Jones & Mehr, 2007).  As Belar and Perry (1992) noted, critical 
thinking is viewed as a centerpiece of this training model according to the National 
Conference on Scientist-Practitioner Education and Training in 1990. 
A second model of graduate clinical training is the Vail or practitioner model, 
which culminates in the conferral of a doctor of psychology (or Psy.D.) degree.  In 
July of 1973 at a conference in Vail, Colorado, the APA and National Institute of 
Mental Health officially recognized the Psy.D. model (Donn, Routh, & Lunt, 2000; 
Mitchell, 1977).  Relative to Ph.D. programs, Psy.D. programs are more likely to: (a) 
focus more heavily on applied clinical work and practice-oriented course material, (b) 
deemphasize data-driven research endeavors (although incorporating research into 
practice ideally remains an emphasis), and (c) not require a formal dissertation 
involving data collection and quantitative data analysis, although many such programs 
do require scholarly projects and non-data-driven dissertations (e.g., theoretical 
papers) (Donn et al., 2000; McIlvried et al., 2010).  In addition, Psy.D. programs, 
many of which are housed in non-university, for-profit schools, typically accept more 
students2, offer less financial aid, and place their graduates in more strictly applied 
clinical settings (vs. academic or research settings) (McIlvried et al., 2010).   
These observations are presented here to illustrate key differences between the 
two dominant training models in contemporary clinical psychology and not to argue 
for the superiority of one model over another per se, although it may be fair to 
hypothesize that the typical student may be more likely to encounter stronger scientific 
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training in a scientist-practitioner or clinical science Ph.D. program compared to the 
average Psy.D. program.  Indeed, as Baker and colleagues (2008, p. 85) suggested, a 
large number of Ph.D. programs likely only pay “lip service” to scientific foundations, 
and a small number of Psy.D. programs do offer rigorous science-based curricula.  At 
any rate, differences often highlighted between prototypical scientist-practitioner 
Ph.D. and practitioner-based Psy.D. programs (i.e., predominantly research- vs. 
practice-based) unavoidably touch upon a broader concern in contemporary clinical 
psychology: the rift between science and practice. 
The term “scientist-practitioner gap” (Cautin, 2011; Tavris, 2003) is often used 
to refer to the schism between sound research and effective practice in clinical 
psychology, although the terminology obviously focuses on the divide between the 
professionals themselves.  Other researchers refer to this same problem more generally 
as the “science-practice gap” (Lilienfeld, 2013).  From one angle, this gap may be 
viewed as the consequence of researcher-practitioner alienation or isolation (e.g., lack 
of overlap in professional contact and activity), which may inadvertently contribute to 
poor clinical care (Teachman et al., 2012).  That is, on the one hand, clinical 
researchers may not have the time, resources, or inclination to focus their professional 
energies on the dissemination of effective interventions to clinicians.  Practitioners, on 
the other hand, may have limited access to up-to-date research on evidence-based 
practice, may not have the inclination to seek out advice from clinical scientists, 
and/or may be reluctant to incorporate scientifically supported techniques into routine 
practice for various reasons (e.g., antipathy toward science and/or research).   
Some scholars, for example, have expressed the belief that most practicing 
 14 
 
therapists are hostile toward (and thus ignore) research because they view it as an 
overly objective approach to a subjective enterprise that attempts to micro-manage 
their professional activities (Pinsof, Goldsmith, & Latta, 2012, p. 253).  A potentially 
harmful consequence of such antagonistic attitudes (if accurate) may be what New 
York Times columnist Harriet Brown (2013, March 25) referred to as a “dim sum” 
approach to psychotherapy, or cobbling together various intervention strategies more 
strongly associated with personal biases and training background than with the up-to-
date research literature.  Unfortunately, there is little-to-no available formal research at 
present (insofar as the author is aware) inquiring into therapist attitudes toward 
research, evidence-based practices, and science in general, thus rendering most of the 
abovementioned commentary conjectural.  Before turning more fully to factors 
potentially associated with the apparent schism that sometimes exists between 
research and practice (e.g., pseudoscience, suboptimal clinical decision-making, and 
other cognitive pitfalls), it is first important to outline the foundations of sound clinical 
psychological science. 
The building blocks of clinical psychological science: RCTs.  Conducting 
sound science in psychology requires careful adherence to scientific method.  
Researchers are expected to engage in disciplined and systematic observation, 
hypothesis development and testing, data collection and analysis, problem solving, 
critical thinking, and the formulation of results and conclusions based on the available 
data (Devilly & Lohr, 2008, pp. 106–108).  In 1991, Richard McFall summarized his 
vision of clinical science within a cardinal principle and two corollaries.  His cardinal 
principle holds that scientifically informed clinical research and practice are the only 
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legitimate forms of clinical psychology.  The first corollary admonishes that 
psychological services should not be publicly disseminated until four conditions have 
been met, to wit: (a) a clear description of the service, (b) an explicit statement of the 
hypothesized benefits of the service, (c) scientific validation of the hypothesized 
benefits, and (d) ruling out potential harmful consequences outweighing service 
benefits.  The second corollary maintains that clinical psychology doctoral programs 
should prioritize the professional development of “the most competent clinical 
scientists possible” (p. 79).  As McFall (1991) subsequently acknowledges, the most 
effective training methodologies suited for this objective are not readily identifiable.  
Nevertheless, a small group of clinical scientists concerned with perceived 
inadequacies in current graduate school curricula and training created the 
Psychological Clinical Science Accreditation System (PCSAS) in 1995 in an effort to 
officially recognize doctoral-level clinical psychology programs and internships 
offering rigorous training in scientific methods applied to both research and practice 
(e.g., scientifically-informed assessment and treatment selection and implementation) 
(Baker, McFall, & Shoham, 2008).  However, it is presently unclear what has come of 
these efforts. 
 McFall (1991) along with other dedicated psychological scientist (e.g., 
Klerman, 1990) strongly advocated for the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
in clinical research, which is one of the cornerstones of clinical science.  RCTs require 
random assignment of participants to treatment conditions and tightly controlled 
procedures to ensure (as best as possible) that participants across groups are treated the 
same with the exception of the intervention component(s) unique to their specific 
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condition (Bolton, 2008).  Stated another way, the crux of controlled clinical trials is 
to isolate and identify treatment components that exert beneficial effects (e.g., 
symptom reduction and/or improvements in life functioning) surpassing the effects (or 
lack thereof) observed in comparison conditions, which may involve no-treatment 
conditions, waiting-list controls (WLCs), psychological placebos3, or standard practice 
treatments already deemed effective, which typically comprise the treatment as usual 
(TAU) category (Bolton, 2008; Kazdin, 2003). 
Whereas participants in WLC conditions temporarily receive no treatment at 
all (i.e., until the conclusion of data collection), those in placebo-control conditions 
still receive an intervention, albeit subtracting out the critical treatment ingredients 
hypothesized to confer additional psychological benefits (i.e., over and above no 
treatment, non-specific therapeutic factors, or TAUs).  Psychological placebos 
assumedly contain all of the generally beneficial yet incidental factors (e.g., treatment 
credibility, expectancy effects, therapeutic alliance influences, etc.) divorced from 
specific therapeutic elements (e.g., interoceptive exposure for panic symptoms) 
hypothesized to confer unique improvements (Herbert & Gaudiano, 2005).  Thus, 
placebo conditions have at least some surface credibility vis-à-vis active treatments 
(see O’Connor et al., 2007, p. 185, for a clear description of an attention placebo 
control procedure compared to a CBT condition for treating delusional symptoms). 
Of course, psychological placebos, which are vastly different from the inert 
sugar pills used in pharmacological research (e.g., sugar pills obviously do not engage 
in human relationships), are not without their share of limitations.  These include a 
lack of perceived treatment credibility to client participants (e.g., transparency of 
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assignment to placebo-control groups), poor congruence of structural features of 
psychological placebo-control groups with target treatments (Baskin, Tierney, 
Minami, & Wampold, 2003), and challenges controlling for and matching expectancy 
effects between control and treatment conditions (Boot, Simons, Stothart, & Stutts, 
2013).  In addition, a substantial portion of what has been traditionally viewed as noise 
or nuisance variance associated with psychological placebos actually consists of 
legitimate but understudied non-specific factors inherent in all forms of mainstream 
psychotherapy (Norcross, 2011; Omer & London, 1989; Wampold, 2001; Wampold et 
al., 2010). 
Devilly and Lohr (2008) described three key categories of non-specific effects, 
namely: (a) common factors, or recognized ubiquitous features of most treatments 
imparting therapeutic benefit (e.g., therapist attention, persuasion, expectancy effects, 
and so forth); (b) unspecified but active factors, where “unspecified” refers to 
palliative features of treatments not explicitly pinpointed as active ingredients (e.g., 
interpersonal influences embedded in therapeutic procedures and sociocultural 
contexts); and (c) factors without specific activity, or factors inherent in many 
treatments that more diffusely allay symptoms through ambiguous (non-specific) 
mechanisms of action (e.g., in the field of medicine, the example of aspirin being used 
to address disparate physical ailments).  Obviously, there is much conceptual overlap 
among and ambiguity within these broad categories.  Furthermore, it is difficult to find 
methodologically sound studies focusing on concrete, isolatable examples of these 
factors in contemporary psychotherapy research, although one exception would be the 
work of Bruce Wampold (2001), who posits a contextual model of psychotherapy (i.e., 
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attempting to clearly delineate and systematically study broad classes of non-specific 
therapeutic actions).  And finally, conceptual problems emerge when one recognizes 
the arbitrariness of distinguishing specific from non-specific factors, which may be 
dependent on the clinician’s theoretical orientation (e.g., accurate empathy would be 
considered a specific factor in humanistic psychotherapies but a non-specific factor in 
CBT) (Herbert & Gaudiano, 2005, p. 897). 
Although the effects of non-specific factors can be powerful (see Wampold, 
2001) and certainly should not be dismissed, these effects alone are often insufficient 
for establishing treatment efficacy and differential effectiveness among different forms 
of psychotherapy (e.g., which treatments work for which conditions, and under what 
circumstances).  Component-controlled efficacy studies assist in clarifying which 
specific ingredients of a particular novel treatment work with ceteris paribus applied 
to non-specific (e.g., interpersonal and contextual) factors as best as can be achieved 
in this complex domain of research (Devilly & Lohr, 2008).  Of note, the importance 
of examining critical mediators and moderators of therapeutic change likewise should 
not be underestimated in this context, nor should the value of longitudinal designs for 
addressing treatment outcome stability and process variables (e.g., specific 
mechanisms of change4 over time) lurking both within and beyond the pre- and post-
treatment interval (Laurenceau, Hayes, & Feldman, 2007).  Despite their limitations, 
RCTs comprise a rigorous scientific research design that far exceeds many other 
clinical decision-making methodologies (e.g., subjective clinical impressions) and 
remains at the heart of efficacy studies, which will be described next in more detail. 
Efficacy and effectiveness research.  Efficacy studies focus primarily on 
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symptom reduction and usually are conducted in research clinics staffed by specially 
trained clinicians and research assistants (Baker et al., 2008; Kazdin, 2003).  
Methodological approaches that typically define efficacy research include random 
assignment, double-blind procedures, placebo or other appropriate treatment 
comparison groups, standardized assessment (e.g., structured or semi-structured 
diagnostic interviews), and adherence to pre-specified inclusion and exclusion criteria 
for research participants (Baker et al., 2008; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Campbell 
& Stanley, 1963).  Properly applied, these procedures work together to strengthen the 
internal validity of efficacy studies, which entails ruling out a complex host of rival 
alternative explanations (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  In the context of treatment 
outcome research, specific threats to internal validity include (but are not limited to): 
(a) the placebo effect (e.g., the combined effects of expectancy, compliance, 
suggestion, distraction from symptoms, etc.); (b) the self-limiting nature of many 
psychopathological conditions (i.e., gradual natural recovery irrespective of 
treatment); (c) spontaneous remission; (d) cyclical symptom variation over time; and 
(e) the impact of self-serving cognitive biases on self-report data (Beyerstein, 1997).   
As Beyerstein (1997) noted, clinical scientists have a professional and ethical 
responsibility to establish that treatments are safe and effective, the latter almost 
always being the most challenging in research due to the necessity of ruling out these 
rival hypotheses.  Failure to address and control for these threats via random 
assignment, the use of placebo-controlled groups, and double blinding often results in 
an unwarranted attribution of observed recovery (e.g., symptom alleviation or 
remission) to dubious interventions (see “The Twilight Zone of EMDR” section of this 
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dissertation for examples of published studies lacking these critical safeguards).  
However, if these controls are properly implemented, and the magnitude of outcome 
improvement in the treatment group is meaningfully larger5 than observed 
improvement in the placebo (or no-treatment, WLC, or TAU) group, this suggests 
treatment efficacy, especially when replicated (Beyerstein, 1997). 
In contrast to efficacy studies, effectiveness studies are quasi-experimental and 
are designed to boost external validity (also termed generalizability or ecological 
representativeness), or the degree to which research findings may be soundly 
extrapolated to real-world clinical scenarios (although additional cross-validation 
procedures are critical for establishing external validity; e.g., see Hoeppner et al., 
2012).  The core question here is the degree to which the intervention works in other 
applied clinical settings outside of the boundaries of the study.  This determination is 
pursued by relaxing stricter degrees of experimental control (e.g., random assignment) 
in order to conduct treatments in more naturalistic, representative settings where the 
usual clinical staff members deliver their typical target interventions to client 
participants, who are not subjected to as stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria.   
Some scholars perceive a tension between efficacy and effectiveness research 
(i.e., rigor and relevance, respectively) and note that the more tightly controlled a 
study, the less results will generalize (see Gelso, 1985).  In contrast, Baker and 
colleagues (2008), frame effectiveness research as bridging the gap between research 
and non-research clinics, and despite some differences in research outcomes 
comparing efficacy and effectiveness studies, effect size estimates are mostly 
concordant (Lambert, 2013; Nathan & Gorman, 2007).  Ideally, clinical interventions 
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that are consistently well supported by replicated efficacy and effectiveness results 
should be broadly disseminated across mental health consumer populations with the 
objective of serving as many clients in need as possible (McHugh & Barlow, 2010). 
Empirically supported treatments.  It is a well-replicated finding that, on 
average, mental health clients receiving psychotherapy evidence more symptom 
remission and functional gains than those either receiving a psychological placebo-
control intervention or not undergoing therapy (see Lambert, 2013).  A more 
contentious and complex question is “what works for whom?” (cf. Roth & Fonagy, 
2005), or more explicitly stated, which interventions work best for which 
psychopathological conditions, and to which populations of mental health clients do 
these findings apply?  In a systematic effort to address the identification of specific 
treatments backed by sound scientific research, Division 12 (Clinical Psychology) of 
the APA organized the Committee on Science and Practice (CSP) in 1993 to develop 
guidelines for defining empirically supported treatments, or ESTs (Task Force, 1995; 
originally called empirically validated treatments or EVTs; Chambless et al., 1996).  
Lists of ESTs with accompanying definitions of categories of evidentiary support were 
subsequently published (Chambless et al., 1996, 1998; see also Chambless & 
Ollendick, 2001).   
According to Division 12 Task Force criteria (see Chambless et al., 1998), 
treatments deemed well-established must be supported by “at least two good between-
group design experiments” with evidence of efficacy via either (a) demonstrated 
beneficial effects over and above placebo or other treatment, or (b) equivalence to a 
previously established treatment (e.g., TAU) with “adequate sample sizes” (p. 4).  An 
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alternative way for treatments to achieve this status is by demonstrating efficacy in “a 
large series of single-case design experiments” (conducted by at least two different 
research teams) involving “good experimental design,” treatment comparison 
conditions, treatment manuals (or, alternatively, explicitly defined intervention 
components and steps), and specified sample characteristics (Chambless et al., 1998, 
p. 4).  One step below well-established treatments are probably efficacious treatments, 
which may meet any one of the following three criteria: (a) demonstrated superiority 
to WLC in at least two separately conducted experiments, (b) meeting all necessary 
well-established treatment criteria with the exception of independent replication by at 
least two different research teams, or (c) meeting well-established treatment criteria 
using a “small series of single-case design experiments” (Chambless et al., 1998, p. 4).  
Finally, experimental treatments are those not yet subjected to the methodological 
scrutiny the Division 12 Task Force (1995; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001) 
recommended. 
Numerous psychosocial interventions for various psychopathological 
conditions have met (and surpassed) the Division 12 Task Force’s well-established 
criteria.  For example, multi-component CBT (i.e., with relapse prevention) for 
tobacco users is an efficacious, effective, disseminable (e.g., easily deliverable by 
telephone; Chen et al., 2014; Swartz et al., 2005), and cost effective preventative 
treatment that consistently improves and maintains smoking cessation outcomes across 
diverse client populations (Hollis et al., 2000; Maciosek et al., 2006; Sheffer et al., 
2009) despite its apparent underutilization (Shiffman, Brockwell, Pillitteri, & 
Glitchell, 2008).  Similarly favorable long-term research results support the use of 
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CBT strategies (especially behavioral interventions) for major depressive disorder 
(Honyashiki et al., 2014), panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (Otto & 
Deveney, 2005), bulimia nervosa (Cooper & Shafran, 2008), posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Foa, Gillihan, & Bryant, 2013), generalized anxiety disorder (Bolognesi, 
Baldwin, & Ruini, 2014), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Lewin, Wu, McGuire, & 
Storch, 2014), hypochondriasis (Olatunji et al., 2014), reduced risk of psychosis 
(Hutton & Taylor, 2014), and various other psychological conditions (see Chambless 
& Ollendick, 2001, for a comprehensive list of ESTs for specific conditions and 
Lambert, 2013, for further details).  In addition, aside from CBT, interpersonal 
psychotherapy is also considered a well-established treatment for depression, as is 
behavioral family therapy for schizophrenia, behavioral marital therapy for marital 
discord, and brief psychodynamic therapy for geriatric depression (Chambless et al., 
1998; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001). 
Many vociferous concerns about the concept of ESTs and their use in clinical 
practice have been raised (e.g., Westen, Novotny, & Thompson-Brenner, 2004).  
Stewart and colleagues (2012) summarized and offered rejoinders to some of the most 
commonly encountered (and often fallacious) objections, including supposed lack of 
generalizability to real-world clinical practice, appeals to clinical intuition and 
expertise as superior or equal to research findings, the specious yet aggressively 
pervasive belief in the Dodo Bird verdict (i.e., the unfounded claim of universal 
treatment equivalence due to the therapeutic alliance, hope, empathy, etc.; see also 
Hofmann & Lohr, 2010, January), and the charge that ESTs are “unfair” because they 
overwhelmingly favor CBT or strictly behavioral interventions over other forms of 
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psychotherapy.  More thoughtful and discussion-worthy objections include the 
observation that placebo-control conditions and WLCs set the evidentiary bar too low 
(Herbert & Gaudiano, 2005), especially in light of the Edinburgh Revision to the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013); and the lack of research-
based guidelines to steer idiographic tailoring of ESTs (i.e., scientifically justified 
specifications for adapting specific approaches to specific conditions for certain kinds 
of clients) (Holt & Beutler, 2014).  The present author agrees with the position that if 
provisional EST lists indeed turn out to boost the ratio of effective, scientifically 
supported treatments to largely ineffective, scientifically counterfeit approaches, then 
these lists are worth compiling and implementing despite their unavoidable 
shortcomings (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Lilienfeld, 2010).  However, the 
objection to the unwieldy impracticality of tailoring many different manualized 
treatment protocols to various DSM disorder categories is well taken (Wachtel, 2010) 
and may justify studying principle-focused approaches instead (e.g., the Unified 
Protocol for Transdiagnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders, which has received 
some preliminary research support; Bullis, Fortune, Farchione, & Barlow, 2014). 
As an important aside, this discussion of ESTs is unavoidably intertwined with 
the contemporary healthcare climate in the United States.  Specifically, as healthcare 
delivery systems, expenditures, and economic decision making (esp. of mental health 
care stakeholders) have continued to change over the past three decades, a growing 
prioritization of cost-effective mental health interventions has emerged (Baker et al., 
2008).  Treatments consistently shown to alleviate psychological distress (using 
assessment tools that quantify symptom severity) in a relatively brief time period over 
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and above the effects of rival interventions will more likely survive the ever-
increasing pressures of managed care (Hayes, Barlow, & Nelson-Gray, 1999).  That is, 
parsimonious interventions (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapies) supported by 
scientific research will likely fare better regarding incorporation into the healthcare 
delivery system and receive insurance reimbursement (Kauth, Sullivan, Cully, & 
Blevins, 2011).  Thus, in the face of dramatically rising costs and service demands in 
mental and behavioral health care (e.g., see Poisal et al., 2007), it remains incumbent 
upon doctoral-level practitioners of clinical psychology to offer interventions that are 
effective, efficacious, cost-effective, and scientifically sound (Baker et al., 2008; 
Beecham et al., 1997) and to monitor real-life clinical outcomes for accountability and 
quality improvement purposes (e.g., Hodges & Wotring, 2004).  These key quality-of-
care criteria are already guiding healthcare coverage decisions as insurance companies 
and governmental agencies continue to oversee increasingly large swaths of funding in 
these areas, and this trend is expected to continue well into the future (Baker et al., 
2008; Committee on Crossing the Quality Chasm: Adaptation to Mental Health and 
Addictive Disorders, 2006; Grizzle, Olson, & Motheral, 2000). 
Despite the pressing need to implement evidence-based interventions under 
increasingly stringent managed care guidelines and the large body of research 
bolstering the manifold benefits ESTs, many psychologists appear unmotivated to 
disseminate, publicly promote, or offer sufficient training in these interventions (Baker 
et al., 2008; Stewart et al., 2012).  For example, evidence suggests that many clinical 
psychology graduate students are not receiving adequate training in ESTs, which may 
partly explain a number of disconcerting survey results among practicing clinicians 
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(e.g., that 23% of a national sample of 891 psychologists reportedly had never heard of 
a treatment manual; Addis & Krasnow, 2000).  The APA Division 12 Task Force 
conducted one of the earliest inquiries into this troubling matter, surveying 167 
training directors of clinical psychology graduate programs (Ph.D. and Psy.D.) in 
North America (Crits-Cristoph, Frank, Chambless, Brody, & Karp, 1995).  The 
investigators’ (1995) results were unsettling.  They found that about one in five 
doctoral-level, APA-accredited programs did not provide any didactic or training in 
75% of available research-supported interventions of known efficacy and effectiveness 
for various disorders; and nearly 50% of training director respondents maintained that 
competency and training in ESTs was of marginal importance. 
Although limited in number, later research studies yielded similarly sobering 
results (e.g., Horan & Blanchard, 2001, winter; Hays et al., 2002).  For example, an 
exploratory survey of 133 APA-accredited clinical internships found that a mere 28% 
of the sites provided more than 15 hours of supervision and training in ESTs (e.g., CT, 
CBT, DBT, and IPT), and furthermore, that 30% of the sites dedicated either minimal 
(19%) or no (11%) time for EST training opportunities (Hays et al., 2002).  Finally, a 
survey of 172 graduate students drawn from 60 APA-accredited clinical, counseling, 
and school doctoral psychology programs revealed that close to two-thirds of 
respondents had never read a single evidence-based treatment related publication (e.g., 
Task Force articles, treatment manuals, etc.), and approximately 32% had never taken 
a course covering EST content or research (Karekla, Lundgren, & Forsyth, 2004).   
Missing from these surveys is information regarding what exactly many 
graduate students are spending their time learning during their pre-doctoral-training 
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years in the place of scientifically supported interventions.  As Lilienfeld (2010) 
conjectured, much of the time not dedicated to learning effective treatments may 
instead be spent learning about non-specific factors (e.g., warmth, empathy, listening, 
etc.) and/or less-than-optimal intervention techniques.  Among the latter lie 
pseudoscientific treatments, which contribute to the professional marginalization of 
the field of clinical psychology. 
The Contours of Pseudoscience 
What is pseudoscience?  In the contemporary climate of second-generation 
managed care and professional accountability, it is incumbent upon mental health 
professionals to choose their interventions with deference to best evidence (Hayes et 
al., 1999).  To do otherwise, such as on the basis of appeals to novelty or what is 
emotionally appealing to the therapist or patient, potentially carries harmful 
consequences for clients and professionals alike.  Although there are many widely 
available evidence-based treatments with sound theoretical underpinnings alongside 
responsible practitioners who adhere to them, pseudoscientific theories and treatments 
remain pervasive in the field of clinical psychology (see Lilienfeld et al., 2003).   
Far from being a novel phenomenon in the current professional landscape (see 
Gardner, 1957), pseudoscience6 has been repeatedly recognized over time as a major 
threat to both public welfare and the scientific foundation and integrity of the field 
(Lilienfeld, 1998, fall).  The proliferation of pseudoscience may be partly attributed to 
anti-science sentiments and the acceleration of commercial marketing of interventions 
(Olatunji, Parker, & Lohr, 2005–2006, fall/winter).  Some psychologists (e.g., past 
APA president Ronald Fox) apparently deem clinical outcome research superfluous as 
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evidenced by public pronouncements of the following ilk: “Psychologists do not have 
to apologize for their treatments. Nor is there an actual need to prove [sic] their 
effectiveness” (Fox, 2000, pp. 1–2).  Other factors likely contributing to the 
proliferation of pseudoscience in psychology include human credulity combined with 
poor critical thinking skills, which may persist despite education level or intelligence 
(Shermer, 2002), vulnerability in the face of refractory mental health conditions, self-
serving biases (including cognitive dissonance), and false hope, all of which may 
hasten the suspension of reason (Beyerstein, 1997; Worrall, 1990). 
 Formal definitions of pseudoscience have proven difficult.  As social 
psychologist Carol Tavris once remarked at an American Psychological Society 
symposium, “Pseudoscience is like pornography; we can’t define it, but we know it 
when we see it” (as cited in McNally, 2003, p. 97).  However, there is substantial 
agreement on an interrelated set of general hallmarks or warning flags of 
pseudoscience (Beyerstein, 1997; Bunge, 1984, fall; Derksen, 1993; Hines, 2003; 
Lilienfeld et al., 2003; Pratkanis, 1995; Ruscio, 2005; Stanovich, 2003), most of which 
were outlined in the Introduction of this dissertation.  Along with concerned 
psychologists, philosophers of science continue to aver the importance of the 
demarcation problem and characterize pseudoscience in similar ways, for example: (a) 
resemblance thinking, or confusing superficial similarities and causal relationships 
(see also Greasley [2010] and the “doctrine of signatures” in “magical medicine” 
described in Hand [1985]); (b) overall resistance to theory evaluation vis-à-vis rival 
theories and selective sensitivity to hypothesis confirmation versus disconfirmation 
(i.e., outright neglect of the scientific method); and (c) consistent lack of theoretical 
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and evidential progress over time (i.e., stagnation of ideas) relative to more successful 
scientific research programs (Thagard, 1978, 1980, 1993).  The more features that can 
be identified within particular psychological theories, assessments, and interventions, 
the more discerning and skeptically cautious mental health professionals and 
consumers should become (Bunge, 1984, fall; Lilienfeld et al., 2003).   
 Although developing checklists of scientific and pseudoscientific features in 
psychology (e.g., see Lilienfeld, 2005) advances the state of inquiry (versus ignoring 
the problem altogether), overly liberal generation of categorical scientific imperatives 
to counter the underpinnings of pseudoscience is probably unwise.  For example, 
despite some superficial compatibility of pseudoscientific theory immunization and 
the principle of methodological tenacity discussed by the controversial “anarchic” 
philosopher Paul Feyerabend (2002), there may be good reasons to maintain a sound 
theoretical model despite negative data or what may initially seem to be disconfirming 
evidence.  Specifically, this may be a justifiable course of action in the presence of 
theory-confirming results from numerous stringent and methodologically sound 
studies with adequate controls and sufficient statistical power despite a small number 
of competing, disconfirming results from studies of poorer methodological quality 
(e.g., disconfirming results from the underpowered study conducted by Quinlan & 
McCaul [2000] do not single-handedly refute the otherwise well-supported tenets of 
the transtheoretical model), or even a small number of anomalous findings from well-
executed studies.  Under such circumstances, some degree of methodological tenacity 
or “light” immunization may be defensible.  However, the principle of tenacity would 
be rendered untenable in circumstances involving the reversal of this hypothetical 
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scenario (i.e., few positive results from poorly conducted studies plus many null 
results from properly designed studies) and would take on an inappropriate form of 
immunization commonly observed in pseudoscientific “degenerative” research 
programs (Lakatos, 1970).  Thus, hard-and-fast rules are ill advised in this context. 
 Lilienfeld (1998, fall) has likened science and pseudoscience to Roschian 
concepts (or “open” concepts; Rosch, 1973) given the absence of unambiguous 
demarcation criteria, although he draws the helpful analogy that distinguishing day 
from night remains practical despite the absence of a clear-cut line of division between 
the two.  In the context of this metaphor, one may think of some treatments as falling 
more squarely within the light of the sun (viz., behavioral and cognitive-behavioral 
strategies) and others as safely confined to nighttime (viz., recovered memory 
techniques and TFT).  However, some treatment packages (e.g., EMDR) present a 
more complex picture and appear to inhabit a “twilight zone” of sorts given a 
combination of both helpful and unhelpful components (Antony & Barlow, 2002; 
Davidson & Parker, 2001; Lohr, Hooke, Gist, & Tolin, 2003).  Of note, an in-depth 
evidentiary overview of EMDR will be provided at the end of this section to illustrate 
the nuances of disentangling efficacious and effective therapy ingredients from inert 
ones under the umbrella of a single intervention. 
 Of interest, most contemporary definitions of pseudoscience in psychology (e.g., 
Lilienfeld, 1998, fall; Lilienfeld et al., 2003; Ruscio, 2005; Thagard, 1993) have 
included both content features (e.g., bizarre claims divorced from evidence) and 
personal reactions to critics (e.g., burden of proof reversal).  However, some 
philosophers of science (e.g., Derksen, 1993; see also Gardner, 1957) and 
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psychologists (e.g., Tolin, 2013, May 28) have contended that the primary concern of 
genuine scientists should be the “pseudoscientists” themselves, because (as noted by 
Derksen, 1993), “…it is a person, and not a theory or field, who can have scientific 
pretensions, and who can be blamed for not making good these pretensions” (p. 21).  
The present author contends that it is likely not entirely possible to parse 
pseudoscientific content from the actions of pseudoscientists as the two most often go 
hand-in-hand.  After all, it is the person who develops and propounds the content, and 
it is the person who deploys any number of ill-supported (or, in some cases, 
intellectually dishonest) escape mechanisms (e.g., ad hoc immunization attempts and 
ad hominem attacks) when repeatedly confronted with disconfirmatory evidence.   
 At the same time, however, it is difficult to deny that certain content in itself 
(generated by a person, of course) should never be characterized as far-fetched within 
the context of the provisional corpus of scientific knowledge.  For example, the 
foundational content of acupuncture, which entails the insertion of needles at 
“acupoints” along twelve undetectable “meridians” (supposedly connected to specific 
human organs and analogically corresponding to the 12 great rivers of China) to 
stimulate the flow of invisible qi (i.e., spiritual “energy” undetectable to physicists) to 
alleviate illnesses, is utterly denuded of evidence (Bausell, 2007, pp. 113–126; Ernst, 
2008; Greasley, 2010; Derry, Derry McQuay, & Moore, 2006; Marcus & 
McCullough, 2009; O’Connell, Wand, & Goldacre, 2009; Slack, 2010, June) 
irrespective of the thoughts and behaviors of its most avid historic proponents (e.g., 
Unschuld, 2003).  For this reason, the present author respectfully disagrees with an 
overly exclusive focus on “pseudoscientists” alone (e.g., Derksen, 1993; Tolin, 2013, 
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May 28).  Rather, the author instead suggests that the interplay of all-too-human 
cognitive shortcomings, powerful emotional convictions, and dubiously formulated 
content divorced from the current state of the scientific research (and, in some cases, 
deliberate charlatanry) interact to foment and perpetuate pseudoscience.  In addition, it 
is important to note that even highly respected, mainstream research scientists are not 
immune from the same cognitive and emotional biases, and thus likewise may utilize 
questionable tactics to defend certain hypotheses or theories of professional interest 
when feeling intellectually threatened, caught off guard, and/or bereft of a polished 
rejoinder (cf. Derksen, 1993, for a more strongly polarized version of this argument, 
viz., “It should be stressed that the excessively pretentious and uncritical scientist is 
not ‘better’ than the pseudo-scientist: he is just more lucky because his theory stands 
in a critical tradition…” [p. 37]). 
 The contentious demarcation problem.  Much passionate philosophical debate 
has surrounded the history of distinguishing meaningful and meaningless content 
(Carnap, 2003), which eventually dovetailed with the perceived meaning and utility of 
distinguishing science from pseudoscience (Gardner, 1957; Pigliucci & Boudry, 2013; 
Popper, 2002).  In the philosophy of science literature, Larry Laudan (1983) famously 
relegated the perennial demarcation problem to irrelevancy, dubbing it a “pseudo-
problem” and referring to the term pseudoscience as merely a “hollow phrase” doing 
“only emotive work for us” (p. 125).  Instead, he emphasized the central importance of 
theory confirmation (see also Derksen, 1993; Laudan, 1996).  Contemporary 
objections in clinical psychology include that of Richard McNally (2003), who 
reviewed a now classic text relevant to the demarcation problem in applied clinical 
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practice (viz., Lilienfeld et al., 2003).  Following in Laudan’s (1983) footsteps, 
McNally (2003) argued that pseudoscience is merely an “inflammatory buzzword” 
serving no useful purpose for disentangling legitimate from illegitimate scientific 
endeavors.  Instead, the primary concern of psychological researchers should be 
inquiring about the state of the evidence for particular claims to the exclusion of 
demarcation questions (McNally, 2003), thus arguably emphasizing an astringent form 
of black box evidentialism (see Shackel, 2013, pp. 421–422) or possibly rote “nose-
counting” exercise (Meehl, 1990) with regard to tallying studies with positive 
outcomes. 
 Conceding the limitations of a priori plausibility, such as bias introduced by 
historically predominant yet potentially mistaken scholarly convictions (Ernst, 2003) 
and the possibility of lapsing into overly dismissive and closed-minded skepticism 
(Sagan, 1995, January/February), it is difficult to deny that a priori plausibility retains 
some value for demarcation purposes (see also Beyerstein, 1997, p. 29).  For example, 
when funding agencies are deciding which research to support financially, how would 
they go about making decisions about treatment outcome studies examining novel 
interventions (i.e., with no current evidence base) vis-à-vis well-established ones?  Is 
an epistemic free-for-all an economically and pragmatically viable approach whenever 
a newly proposed intervention emerges?  Or would an informed attempt to identify 
faulty conceptual rationales and mechanisms at the outset prove beneficial for saving 
valuable time and resources (e.g., those congruent with what is already known to be 
false and non-scientific, e.g., the principle of analogic correspondences in astrology 
and herbal remedies; see Greasley, 2010)?  Here, an exclusive academic reliance on 
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strict evidential warrant falls short. 
 It is the author’s contention that there is value in continuing to discuss and 
clarify the demarcation problem in applied clinical practice given the prevalence of 
interventions known to be outright ineffective and/or potentially harmful to mental 
health clients (Lilienfeld et al., 2003).  Otherwise, we may waste time and resources 
unknowingly chasing pseudoscience, all the while lacking an a priori toolkit for 
separating sense from nonsense.  As acknowledged in the philosophy of science 
literature, there appear to be two demarcation problems, namely, a philosophical 
conundrum and a practical challenge, the latter encompassing the substantial influence 
on public policy decisions in education, medicine, law, and scientific research funding 
(Resnik, 2000).  As articulated by Resnik (2003) at the conclusion of his philosophical 
analysis of the demarcation problem, “Our reaction should be that one can distinguish 
between scientific and unscientific activities even though one cannot rely on a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions gleaned from an abstract theory of science to 
perform this task” (p. 258).  In other words, despite inherent logical and philosophical 
difficulties in delineating unequivocal boundaries between science and pseudoscience, 
a set of helpful (albeit admittedly limited) criteria (e.g., Bunge, 1984, fall) may be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, although questions about the supposed practical 
effectiveness of demarcation criteria would ultimately require meta-scientific study to 
be addressed appropriately (cf. Faust & Meehl, 2002).  Attention will now be turned to 
an extended review of EMDR, and it is hoped that this discussion will assist in 
illustrating the complexities of distinguishing science from pseudoscience in clinical 
psychology. 
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The Twilight Zone of EMDR: Between Shadow and Substance 
Since its inception, Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR; 
Shapiro, 1989a, 1995; Shapiro & Forrest, 2004) has remained a hotly debated 
psychotherapeutic intervention.  Although typically lauded as a speedy remedy for 
PTSD symptoms (Shapiro, 1989a), EMDR is touted as a “breakthrough therapy” 
applicable to a wide variety of distressing psychological symptoms according to its 
founder, psychologist Francine Shapiro (Shapiro & Forrest, 2004).  Shapiro (1989a; 
1989b; 1994b; 1995) has claimed that EMDR can permanently alleviate the symptoms 
of PTSD in only a couple of sessions and is more effective than extant cognitive 
behavioral interventions, albeit in the absence of systematic research evidence.  Given 
what is known about the intransigent and often debilitating nature of severe PTSD 
(among other anxiety disorders), the glowing testimonials and putatively supportive 
research associated with EMDR should be met with skepticism, and closer scrutiny of 
the efficacy and effectiveness of this intervention is warranted. 
What is EMDR?  The advent of EMDR is not linked to any particular 
theoretical rationale or compelling logical synthesis, but rather to an anecdotal 
personal event recounted by Dr. Francine Shapiro.  While taking a walk in a park one 
day in the spring of 1987 and feeling overburdened by distressing thoughts, Shapiro 
remarked that she instantly felt better after her eyes spontaneously flitted back and 
forth, thus attributing her improved mood to lateral eye movements (Shapiro & 
Forrest, 2004).  Afterward, she recounted practicing this technique on her friends and 
acquaintances, many of whom allegedly felt instantly relieved from feelings of anxiety 
or sadness (Shapiro & Forrest, 2004).  Eventually, her experience was translated into 
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the rhythmic back-and-forth visual tracking technique (bilateral sensory stimulation, 
or BSS) that now defines EMDR (Shapiro, 1999). 
The common sequence of steps comprising an EMDR therapy session (cf. 
Shapiro, 1991; Shapiro & Forrest, 2004) can be summarized as follows.  First, the 
therapist asks the patient to close his or her eyes and imagine the distressing traumatic 
memory (or a representational image) in vivid detail, much like a typical imaginal 
exposure.  While holding the recalled event in mind, the therapist asks the patient to 
verbalize any aversive emotional and/or physiological reactions to the event in a 
sentence.  Using a Subjective Units of Distress (or SUDs) scale ranging from 0 (no 
anxiety) to 10 (extreme anxiety), the patient rates the intensity of psychological 
distress experienced while imagining the event. 
Next, according to the author (cf. Shapiro, 1991; Shapiro & Forrest, 2004), the 
patient is asked to generate an optimistic statement about the event and subsequently 
gauge the degree of belief in the positive appraisal using a Validity of Cognition 
(VoC) scale ranging from 0 (no belief) to 8 (absolute belief).  This positive reframing 
of the traumatic event in conjunction with bolstering its believability constitutes the 
reprocessing phase of EMDR.  While still engaging in the imaginal exposure of the 
feared scenario, the therapist continues the desensitization process by initiating the 
technique of BSS, which requires the patient to visually follow the therapist’s finger as 
it sweeps in a lateral, back-and-forth motion approximately 12–14 inches away from 
the patient’s eyes.  EMDR therapists typically sweep their finger at a rate of two 
repetitions per second and total 12–24 repetitions for an average set of repetitions.  
Exposure to periodic tones in different ears or finger taps can substitute for finger 
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sweeps if patients are blind or suffer from vision problems (Shapiro, 1994a; 1995).  
Finally, therapists ask their patients to “blank out” or forget about the traumatic image, 
breathe deeply, and provide follow-up SUDs and VoC scores after each set of finger 
sweeps.  Finger sweep sets are typically repeated until reported SUDs decrease (e.g., 
SUDs threshold ≤ 2) and VoC scores increase (e.g., VoC threshold ≥ 6) (see 
description provided by Lilienfeld, 2008; Shapiro & Forrest, 2004). 
The primary difficulty with Shapiro’s claims is not necessarily that her 
proposed bilateral sensory procedure was borne out of a private experience in a park.  
Indeed, some ideas emerging from memorable personal experiences, wild hunches, 
dreams, and other methods of creative or serendipitous freethinking may turn out to be 
correct upon further testing and corroboration.  In his personal correspondence with 
psychologist Donald Peterson, Paul Meehl pointed out that the German chemist 
Friedrich Kekulé’s reverie of a snake consuming its own tail (viz., an ouroboris) 
assisted with solidifying the Lewis structure for benzene that remains accepted by 
chemists to the present day, although other non-dream-related evidence came to bear 
on this hypothesized structure well before the daydream (Peterson, 2005, pp. 67–68).  
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to know with precision from the history of 
science how frequently such creative hunches are associated with accurate versus 
inaccurate scientific findings.  That is, we are most likely primarily aware of the 
successful “hits” as opposed to the “misses,” with instances when scientists’ creative 
ideas turned out to be wrong relegated to the dustbins of history.  Thus, the 
dubiousness of the main tenets of EMDR does not necessarily lie in how they were 
generated per se.  As noted by Thagard (1978, p. 225), “Origins are irrelevant to 
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scientific status,” although probably not totally irrelevant in this author’s opinion (see 
previous comments on a priori plausibility concerns, plus this is a logician’s argument 
that, while logically correct, merits testing for its accuracy from the standpoint of 
empiricism).  Rather, the central problem is that the proposed mechanisms of action 
(and their hypothesized effects) have repeatedly failed to withstand the rigors of 
scientific testing. 
How does EMDR purportedly work?  There is a clear consensus among 
most critics of EMDR that the underpinning theoretical rationale is poorly elucidated 
and does not square with what is known about the etiology, maintenance, and 
alleviation of pathological trauma and anxiety (e.g., Keane, 1998; Lilienfeld, 2008; 
Lohr et al., 2003).  As Keane and Barlow (2002) noted, although these criticisms are 
not grounds for total a priori dismissal of the potential utility of EMDR, it is important 
to consider the utility of sound conceptual foundations supported by previous research, 
which in turn may assist with formulating plausible hypotheses and predictions.   
To her credit, Shapiro (e.g., 1994b; 1995) has attempted to clarify how EMDR 
works, although its fit with current understanding of neuroscience and models of 
cognitive behavioral change is highly questionable (Keane & Barlow, 2002).   
Specifically, Shapiro (1995; cf. Shapiro & Forrest, 2004) posited that the mechanism 
behind EMDR relies on accelerated information processing (AIP), an explanatory 
model purportedly based on neuropsychological principles.  In brief, a given traumatic 
event is thought to impinge upon the nervous system in such a way that distressing 
information associated with the event becomes encoded without being processed, 
resulting in neurobiological “blockages.”  Traumatic memories are thus improperly 
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stored and must undergo more adaptive reprocessing and assimilation in the brain 
through EMDR techniques, such as the back-and-forth eye movements.  BSS 
purportedly expedites the neuropsychological processing of traumatic material by 
moving information more efficiently through memory networks, much like unclogging 
a clogged pipeline.  Through this dynamically activated processing system, the 
traumatic content is unlocked.  Of note, this explanation can be characterized as a 
reification fallacy (cf. Gabel, 1976), or concretizing a conceptual metaphor as a 
psychophysical mechanism of action. 
Shapiro (1994b) has also conjectured that beneficial effects of EMDR may 
result from mimicking eye movements similar to those observed during rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep, which supposedly aid in the “processing” of traumatic 
memories previously inaccessible to the “conscious mind.”  However, no proposed 
neuropsychological mechanism driving the proposed “processing” or how this could 
alleviate distress has been proposed, and there is of yet no research demonstrating that 
brain activity associated with undergoing EMDR reflects brain activity during REM 
sleep (Lilienfeld, 2008).  Also of note is the disconnect between involuntary REM 
sleep eye movements and the smooth, voluntary visual tracking of stimuli in EMDR 
(Lohr, Tolin, & Lilienfeld, 1998), a qualitative biological comparison gap never 
broached by EMDR advocates.  In addition, Shapiro’s contention that traumatic 
memories can be repressed or blocked (i.e., in a manner different from forgetting) is 
itself a deeply controversial claim that lacks a foundation of systematic scientific 
research support outside of clinical folklore and confected anecdotes (McNally, 2004). 
Loose boundary conditions and rapid dissemination.  As noted earlier, 
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EMDR was purportedly crafted for the primary purpose of alleviating the symptoms 
of PTSD (e.g., Posmontier, Dovydaitis, & Lipman, 2010), although its boundary 
conditions remain loosely delineated.  EMDR has also been recommended for the 
treatment of various specific phobias (de Jongh, Broeke, & Renssen, 1999), including 
claustrophobia (Lohr, Tolin, & Kleinknecht, 1996) and spider phobia (Muris, 
Merkelbach, van Haaften, & Mayer, 1997), as well as chronic pain (Grant & Threlfo, 
2002), eating disorders (Hudson, Chase, & Pope, 1998), intellectual disabilities 
(Rodenburg, Benjamin, Meijer, & Jongeneel, 2009), generalized anxiety disorder 
(Gauvreau & Bouchard, 2008), deviant sexual arousal (Ricci, Clayton, & Shapiro, 
2006), “morbid jealousy” (Keenan & Farrell, 2000), various addictions (Marich, 
2010), and “excessive grief, rage, and guilt” (Shapiro, 1991, p. 135).  A paucity of 
research findings demonstrating efficacy for specific disorders and emotional 
difficulties has not restrained some psychologists from making bold assertions, such as 
the claim that EMDR is effective in treating ADHD (Tinker & Wilson, 1999) and can 
improve emotional intimacy in couples’ therapy in the form of Eye Movement 
Relationship Enhancement (EMRE; Protinsky, Flemke, & Sparks, 2001). 
The vociferous positive claims of EMDR proponents about treating PTSD 
appear to drown out more sober appraisals of existing data.  For example, Shapiro 
(1989b; Shapiro & Forrest, 2004) declared that a single 50-minute EMDR session 
could substantially reduce or even permanently alleviate PTSD symptoms, a strong 
claim that has not been substantiated in the literature described next in this review.  
EMDR was even featured during a 1995 ABC News 20/20 segment (Walters, 1995), 
which relied on appeals to authority (i.e., the proclaimed expertise of psychologist 
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Stephen Silver) in lieu of research findings to portray EMDR as a radical breakthrough 
treatment for various psychological disorders.  Bessel van der Kolk, a renowned 
Boston University professor of psychiatry, reported to the Los Angeles Times in 2002: 
“EMDR sounds like utter nonsense, but this weird thing has a profound effect on 
people” (Marsa, 2002, March 25).  Other dramatic and colorful claims include the 
supposed ability of EMDR to “pinpoint a specific trauma and target that like a laser 
beam” (Marsa, 2002, March 25). 
By the mid-1990s, over 14,000 psychotherapists had been officially trained to 
administer EMDR in the United States and abroad (Bower, 1995).  Although exact 
dissemination statistics are uncertain, most likely due to the secretiveness surrounding 
EMDR training in general (Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 2008), Shapiro (2004) claimed 
that approximately 20,000 mental health professionals had been trained in EMDR as 
of 2004, suggesting a possible increase in dissemination about a decade after the 
Bower (1995) survey.  The popularity of EMDR is unlikely to wane anytime soon, 
especially in view of the World Health Organization’s (2013; see Recommendation 
14) recent public recommendation that CBT, EMDR, and stress management should 
be considered for children and adults diagnosed with PTSD.  Amidst the prematurely 
aggressive dissemination of EMDR and media hype surrounding its purportedly 
remarkable healing qualities, critical questions are lost in the fracas:  Does EMDR 
actually work as well as is commonly claimed? And if so, does it work in accordance 
with its proposed mechanisms of change? 
What is the state of the evidence?  Shapiro (1989a) conducted the first study 
examining the effects of EMDR using a control group.  In this investigation, 22 
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participants, all having experienced a potentially traumatic event, were randomly 
assigned to an EMDR condition or an imaginal exposure condition without BSS.  As 
hypothesized, the EMDR group evidenced significant reductions in SUDs scores and 
elevations in VoC scores compared to the imaginal exposure group.  Although 
superficially plausible, these results and other similar findings have been roundly 
criticized (cf. Acierno et al., 1994; Lilienfeld, 2008) on the grounds that a double-blind 
procedure was lacking (e.g., Shapiro conducted both treatments herself and personally 
elicited patient ratings), thus possibly resulting in demand characteristics and/or a 
Pygmalion effect; exposure times differed across treatment groups; and criteria for 
terminating distressing imaginal exposures differed across treatment groups (viz., only 
the EMDR patients were allowed to stop the exposures contingent upon SUDs 
reductions). 
 Another major methodological weakness characterizing Shapiro’s earlier 
studies (e.g., Shapiro, 1989a) is the absence of control groups (see Lilienfeld, 2008).  
Lacking a control group results in a failure to account for the hypothetical 
counterfactual, or how the patient’s symptoms and distress would have fared in the 
absence of treatment administration (Dawes, 1994).  For reasons often articulated in 
methodology and design texts (e.g., Campbell & Stanley, 1963), drawing strong 
conclusions about unique treatment effects from uncontrolled studies is problematic 
(e.g., inability to draw sound causal inferences, difficulty ruling out placebo effects, 
history effects, maturation, instrumentation, regression to the mean, spontaneous 
remission, etc.).  In addition, combinatory treatments with impure independent 
variables (e.g., EMDR plus relaxation plus exposure) obfuscate unique effects 
 43 
 
attributable to BSS, which remains a key component of EMDR purported to 
substantially decrease psychological distress (Shapiro & Forrest, 2004). 
Lohr and colleagues (1998) reviewed 17 group-design investigations of 
sounder methodological quality and rigor (e.g., inclusion of random assignment and 
dismantling designs) compared to previous uncontrolled designs (e.g., Shapiro, 
1989b).  These authors uncovered systematic evidentiary trends directly contradicting 
claims of superior efficacy made by EMDR advocates, such as (a) effect size 
equivalence (Cohen’s d = .90) across EMDR and non-EMDR exposure treatments; (b) 
lack of control for therapist by treatment confounds (e.g., therapist enthusiasm and 
allegiance to EMDR); (c) overreliance on participants’ verbal reports of feeling better 
in the absence of behavioral and physiological measures; (d) lack of significant 
differences between EMDR and exposure controls (with stationary eye analogue) on 
behavioral or physiological indicators when they were used (e.g., heart rate, skin 
conductance, and blood pressure); and (e) lack of significant differences in reported 
symptom (e.g., Mississippi PTSD Scale) and associated distress (e.g., SUDs) 
reduction rates across EMDR versus exposure control conditions over time (post-
treatment to six-month follow-up).   
In the PTSD studies that Lohr and colleagues (1998) examined, although 
exposure controls and EMDR both yielded better outcomes on SUDs ratings, heart 
rate, and PTSD symptom ratings compared to no-exposure control groups, EMDR and 
exposure controls did not significantly differ on any outcome measures.  In the 
reviewed panic studies, EMDR was more efficacious than no treatment but equivalent 
to no-movement bilateral stimulation analogues.  In the reviewed specific phobia 
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studies, although self-report fear reductions were significantly greater in EMDR 
conditions in some comparisons (i.e., Muris et al., 1997), participants assigned to in 
vivo exposure conditions showed greater improvement on avoidance indicators than 
participants in EMDR conditions, even when EMDR therapists’ clinical experience 
surpassed that of the in vivo therapists.  
The majority of Lohr and colleagues’ (1998) conclusions from their 
comprehensive review have been independently corroborated in earlier (e.g., Foa & 
Meadows, 1997) as well as later (Albright & Thyer, 2010) studies and reviews.  In the 
context of phobic avoidance, Antony and Barlow (2002) reported little to no 
behavioral (e.g., avoidance ratings made by researchers) or physiological (e.g., lower 
heart rate and blood pressure) evidence to corroborate patients’ verbal reports of fear 
reduction.  In other words, objective indicators have not been utilized to bolster the 
beneficial impact of EMDR on symptom alleviation.  Rather, positive effects remain 
confined primarily to patients merely saying that they feel better, thus failing to meet 
triangulation standards (cf. Campbell, 1956). 
In a recent study of 74 female rape victims with chronic PTSD symptoms 
(Rothbaum, Astin, & Marsteller, 2005), there were no significant differences in PTSD 
symptom reductions between EMDR and prolonged imaginal exposure (PE).  This 
study had the added benefit of including self-report instruments (e.g., the PTSD 
Symptom Scale-Self Report and Impact of Event Scale-Revised) as well as structured 
and semi-structured clinical assessment interviews (e.g., the Clinician-Administered 
PTSD Scale and SCID) conducted by independent raters blind to treatment condition.  
Treatment integrity ratings were also included. 
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It is important to note that a number of studies questioning EMDR efficacy and 
effectiveness can be classified as experimental dismantling studies7 (e.g., Cahill, 
Carrigan, & Frueh, 1999; Renfrey & Spates, 1994), which are sometimes called 
additive or subtractive designs (Lohr et al., 2003).  These studies entail the removal of 
specific treatment elements (i.e., BSS) from otherwise intact treatment packages, 
which can be compared to treatments containing the component in question to 
determine if removal diminishes treatment efficacy (cf. Hart, Fann, & Novack, 2008).  
These types of designs thus aid in disentangling specific from non-specific treatment 
factors.  Studies pitting EMDR against exposure control conditions lacking BSS have 
detected no significant differences in treatment effects as shown by standardized 
psychological and physiological measures (see Boudewyns, Stwertka, Hyer, Albrecht, 
& Sperr, 1993).  Renfrey and Spates (1994) discovered that when the eyes are fixed on 
a stationary light, thus subtracting out the eye sweep technique that is the lynchpin to 
the bilateral sensory stimulation rationale, the treatment results are no different from 
those of EMDR including the technique.  Follow-up studies using similar no-
movement analogues with Australian Vietnam veterans suffering from PTSD have 
replicated this negative finding (Devilly, Spence, & Rapee, 1998).  Taken together, 
these results cast serious doubt on the claim that the eye movement component is 
needed at all in EMDR. 
Perkins and Rouanzoin (2002) cogently summarize the manifold 
methodological, statistical, and conceptual shortcomings plaguing EMDR as follows: 
(a) lack of a valid empirical framework that coherently predicts and explains observed 
treatment effects; (b) lack of methodologically sound studies; (c) the possibility of the 
 46 
 
file drawer problem (i.e., lack of reporting null results combined with a selective 
sensitivity to publishing positive results) among EMDR researchers with vested 
interests in positive outcomes; (d) an accumulation of positively biased reports by a 
homogeneous group of researcher-clinicians with a personal stake in the matter; and 
(e) suspected inconsistencies in treatment fidelity across studies.  Despite this clear 
confluence of data pointing to the therapeutic impotence of the eye movement 
technique, EMDR as a whole continues to be heralded as a “breakthrough treatment” 
(Shapiro & Forrest, 2004) and has been dubbed potentially effective by both the 
Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense (2004). 
Briefly, with regard to diversity issues, few studies have discussed ethno-racial 
or cultural factors in the context of EMDR treatment, typically going no further than 
providing demographics tables in results sections.  The vast majority of research 
participants across virtually all studies cited within this review were Caucasian 
adolescents and adults, with African Americans comprising a small percentage of 
participants (e.g., 2-3%).  Among the few articles recruiting samples from non-North 
American populations was an investigation of EMDR involving a small group of 
Iranian children aged 12-13 (Jaberghaderi, Greenwald, Rubin, Zand, & Dolatabadi, 
2004) and a single-session EMDR group intervention conducted with a sample of 
children aged 4-17 following the calamitous 2003 flooding in Santa Fe, Argentina 
(Adúriz, Bluthgen, & Knopfler, 2009). 
In the Middle Eastern study (Jaberghaderi et al., 2004), 14 Iranian children 
with histories of sexual abuse were randomly assigned to either an exposure-based 
CBT condition (n = 7) or an EMDR condition (n = 7) to be treated for trauma 
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symptoms.  Comparisons of pre- and post-treatment measures of self- and other-
reported PTSD symptoms alongside behavioral ratings made by parents and teachers 
revealed roughly equal efficacy of CBT and EMDR, but the authors concluded that 
EMDR was more efficient (e.g., fewer sessions and more rapid intra-session SUDs 
reductions).  However, this latter conclusion is questionable given that the CBT 
condition required a minimum of 10 sessions with heavy psychoeducational 
requirements, whereas the EMDR condition categorically lacked these requirements 
with termination contingent on quickly reaching low SUDs thresholds.  Similar 
favorable results were found for the EMDR intervention in the South American study 
(Adúriz et al., 2009), which recruited 124 schoolchildren who had been forced to 
evacuate their homes with their families due to severe flooding.  Although SUDs 
ratings significantly decreased from pre- to post-treatment and PTSD symptoms (e.g., 
intrusion and avoidance symptoms) and remained significantly lower at 3-month 
follow-up, there was no CBT group or control group included for comparison.  
Enhancing the methodological quality of and participant recruitment efforts associated 
with these sorts of studies is critical given the insufficient inclusion rates of ethnic 
minorities and non-North American samples in efficacy studies and small sample 
sizes—shortcomings that have continued to hamper generalizability (i.e., external 
validity) of results to ethno-culturally diverse populations (Miranda, Nakamura, & 
Bernal, 2003). 
EMDR: A concluding summary of the evidence.  The aforementioned 
studies all converge on the same conclusion:  The observed effectiveness of EMDR in 
the extant literature can be reasonably attributed to its imaginal exposure component 
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and not BSS (Antony & Barlow, 2002; Davidson & Parker, 2001).  Evidence 
supporting the therapeutic contribution of bilateral sensory stimulation components 
(i.e., lateral ocular movements and alternating visual field stimulation) is either weak 
or non-existent (Davidson & Parker, 2001; Lohr et al., 2003).  When writing their 
comprehensive review of state-of-the-art interventions for PTSD, Keane and Barlow 
(2002) asserted that no existing study to date had demonstrated incremental efficacy of 
EMDR over and above any existing evidence-based treatment for PTSD (i.e., anxiety 
management training, cognitive restructuring techniques, and imaginal exposures).  
Nearly thirteen years later, this observation remains unchallenged by methodologically 
sound studies.  Furthermore, compared to individuals who have undergone EMDR, 
those who receive traditional CBT for PTSD symptoms have attained greater 
treatment gains as evidenced by both post-treatment and follow-up assessments 
(Devilly & Spence, 1999).  Until a coherent synthesis of data contradicts this body of 
evidence, there would seem to be no defensible rationale for replacing tried-and-true 
CBT techniques with EMDR. 
Of note, this review illustrates EMDR proponents’ striking neglect of rigorous 
scientific inquiry into purported mechanisms of change through various 
pseudoscientific maneuvers, namely, (a) dispensing with the proper methodological 
toolkits associated with efficacy and effectiveness research; (b) repeatedly 
exaggerating unfounded claims that a specific, unsupported treatment element (in this 
case, BSS) works; and (c) ignoring extant evidence that the impact of BSS appears to 
be no greater than non-specific or placebo effects at best.  Thus, the BSS component 
of EMDR may be viewed as pseudoscientific as a function of its inertness in the 
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inseparable context of intransigent confirmatory attitudes of avid proponents as well as 
the scientific implausibility of the proposed theoretical underpinnings.  This illustrates 
a possible compatibilist stance between the distracting debates on whether we should 
focus exclusively on pseudoscientists (e.g., Derksen, 1993; Tolin, 2013, May 28) or 
pseudoscientific content (e.g., Bunge, 1984, fall; Lilienfeld et al., 2003).  In this sense, 
the pseudoscience label may provide a concise and informative descriptive heuristic, 
as it is not being used in a cavalier, dismissive, or inflammatory ad hominem manner. 
The burden of elucidating and laying the ground for testing proposed 
neuropsychological mechanisms of action of EMDR lies with the claimants.  In lieu of 
evasive, ad hoc defensive maneuvering, such as Shapiro’s revisionist statement 
suggesting that eye movement is neither a necessary nor sufficient treatment 
component (see Lohr, Hooke, Gist, & Tolin, 2003), EMDR proponents should try to 
develop a concrete set of testable hypotheses nested within a clear, coherent rationale 
drawing from the extant research literature on anxiety and trauma.  However, given 
the data already scrutinized, it may be argued that such a step would thrust us squarely 
into a fallacy of misplaced rationalism (Sheaffer, 2008).  In other words, EMDR 
enthusiasts may be attempting to speciously explain an inert, non-existent 
phenomenon from a position of post hoc rationalization, thus further exacerbating the 
pseudoscientific practice of immunization from falsification (see Bunge, 1984, fall).  
In this sense, future research directions are not entirely clear. 
Pseudoscience: What’s the Harm? 
 Interventions based on pseudoscience may not merely contain inert 
components that fail to provide benefits (e.g., as observed with BSS in EMDR)–rather, 
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they may harm clients.  Overall, psychotherapy researchers have paid scant attention 
to baneful consequences of psychological treatments in recent decades, although 
within the past 5 years, some literature has focused on raising awareness of potentially 
harmful treatments (or PHTs; Castonguay et al., 2010) and how to detect and address 
such effects (Dimidjian & Hollon, 2010).  Moreover, some psychologists support the 
creation of an official list of PHTs similar to existing EST lists (Castonguay et al., 
2010; Lilienfeld, 2007).  
PHTs were first formally defined by Lilienfeld (2007) as interventions that 
have resulted in adverse psychological and/or physical effects that are both enduring 
(i.e., not merely a temporary worsening of symptoms) and have been replicated by 
independent lines of research.  By psychological effects, Lilienfeld (2007) refers to 
symptom exacerbation plus attenuated improvement rate over the course of care.  And 
by physical effects, he refers to either physical harm (e.g., risk of parasitic infections 
or injury from aggressive mating behavior in dolphin-assisted psychotherapy; Marino 
& Lilienfeld, 2007; Samuels & Spradlin, 1995) or death (e.g., as has occurred in 
rebirthing therapy; Josefson, 2001).  Among provisionally identified PHTs are several 
psychological treatments classed as pseudoscientific, namely, critical incident stress 
debriefing (CISD), rebirthing therapy (RT), and recovered memory therapy (RMT), 
which will be reviewed briefly in turn. 
CISD is a 3–4-hour, single-session group psychotherapy procedure in which 
clients openly disclose distressing thoughts and feelings in the aftermath of a 
potentially traumatic event, assumedly to avoid the onset of PTSD symptoms (Lohr, 
Hook, Gist, & Tolin, 2003).  According to the guidelines of CISD, clients must (a) 
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participate in therapy no later than 24 to 72 hours after the trauma, (b) discourage one 
another from leaving the therapy group once it has begun, and (c) discuss possible 
PTSD symptoms that they may face as a result of the traumatic event (Lohr & Fowler, 
2002, summer; Lohr et al., 2003).  Of note, CISD has been found to be consistently 
ineffective at best and possibly harmful at worst (e.g., worsened PTSD symptoms in 
CISD groups compared to assessment-only controls) in treating PTSD symptoms 
across both meta-analyses (e.g., effect size of d = –.11; Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 
2002) and RCTs (e.g., Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander, & Bannister, 1997; Mayou, Ehlers, 
& Hobbs, 2000).  Some researchers have hypothesized that observed PTSD symptom 
exacerbation at follow-up may be partly due to interference with natural symptom 
remission (Gist & Woodall, 1995).  As opposed to using systematic desensitization 
(with the goal being gradual habituation) in tandem with practicing alternative 
adaptive responses to alleviate symptoms associated with distressing aspects of a 
trauma (as is the case in evidence-based CBT approaches; Foa, Zoellner, & Feeny, 
2006), CISD instead encourages therapists to ask direct questions about the worst 
aspects of the trauma during the reactions/cathartic ventilation phase (i.e., shortly after 
the trauma) in the absence of teaching coping techniques (Devilly, Gist, & Cotton, 
2006).  This may be especially problematic for subgroups of patients who struggle 
with dysregulated hyperarousal (Devilly et al., 2006). 
 RT is a type of attachment therapy that has been flagged as potentially 
dangerous depending on how it is practiced (Mercer, 2008).  RT was introduced in 
1974 by Leonard Orr, a self-proclaimed pioneer of the New Age movement who 
continues to lead the Rebirthing Breathwork movement and claims to have unlocked 
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the secrets of physical immortality (cf. Orr’s 1998 book, Breaking the Death Habit: 
The Science of Everlasting Life).  Orr proposed that human birth is always 
accompanied by a fear of suffocation triggered by the premature severing of the 
umbilical cord, which supposedly damages the person’s “breathing mechanism” and 
embeds panic deep into the subconscious mind (Singer & Lalich, 1996, pp. 42–43).  
This repressed fear purportedly resurfaces in the form of both psychological (e.g., 
anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem) and physical ailments (e.g., allergies, weight 
problems, and cancer), and Orr proclaimed that several 2-hour “rebirthing” sessions 
(e.g., practicing patterned breathing techniques while floating or snorkeling in a hot 
tub) is usually sufficient for healing these conditions as well as fostering psychic 
abilities (Singer & Lalich, 1996, pp. 42–44).   
Other variants of rebirthing include dramatic “recapitulations” (as described in 
the psychoanalytic attachment literature) of the birth process by wrapping up clients, 
especially young children with developmental problems, in carpets or blankets while 
squeezing them, taunting them, and encouraging them to struggle free (Lilienfeld, 
2007; Mercer, 2008).  Not only do these preposterous and needlessly abusive 
techniques lack any supporting research evidence (e.g., no RCTs have been conducted, 
and no evidence of efficacy or effectiveness can be found in the peer-reviewed 
literature), but they also have resulted in reported serious injuries and even deaths, 
including the asphyxiation of a 10-year-old girl in Colorado in 2001 (Mercer, 2008).  
Of note, the two social workers responsible for the girl’s death were sentenced to 16 
years in prison, and a new legal mandate known as Candace’s law, which prohibits 
restraint in psychotherapy, was passed in Colorado and North Carolina shortly 
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thereafter (Josefson, 2001; Mercer, 2008). 
 Finally, RMT entails the use of various highly questionable, poorly supported 
techniques (e.g., hypnosis, “age regression,” sodium pentathol administration, guided 
imagery, and/or therapist interpretations of symptoms) to recover memories of 
traumatic past events assumed to have taken place during a client’s childhood (Lynn, 
Loftus, Lilienfeld, & Lock, 2008).  As summarized elsewhere (Loftus, 1993; Lynn, 
Lock, Loftus, Krackow, & Lilienfeld, 2003; Lynn et al., 2008; Singer & Lalich, 1996; 
Singer & Nievod, 2003), these memories supposedly become “repressed” deep into 
the unconscious mind due to the intense trauma and emotional pain associated with 
aversive early experiences.  The supposed recovered memories are frequently of 
questionable veracity and have a number of bizarre cottage industry therapy 
movements associated with them (e.g., Satanic ritual abuse therapy, alien abduction 
therapy, past-life regression, and entities therapy; see Singer & Nievod, 2003).  RMT 
advocates (e.g., Fredrickson, 1992) posit that if these memories are not recovered and 
emotionally processed in therapy, they may result in a host of baleful life 
consequences, including chronic psychological distress, tumultuous relationships, 
professional failure, and in extreme cases, personality fragmentation resulting in 
dissociative identity disorder (formerly multiple personality disorder).  Not 
surprisingly, evidence supporting the efficacy and effectiveness of RMT is either 
woefully inadequate or non-existent at the present time, and RMT memory retrieval 
techniques (esp. hypnosis) in particular have been thoroughly debunked with regard to 
reconstructing accurate representations of past events (see Lynn et al., 2008, for a 
review). 
 54 
 
Sadly, RMT has resulted in a multitude of wrongful prosecutions of and civil 
lawsuits against parents who allegedly sexually abused their children (Loftus, 1995; 
Maran, 2010; Wakefield & Underwager, 1992), evidence for which was gathered 
during therapy sessions using the questionable procedures mentioned in the previous 
paragraph (see also Loftus & Ketcham, 1994).  Of note, many of these unfortunate 
accusations occurred in the heat of a mass hysteria known as the “Satanic Panic,” 
which swept across the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s (Nathan & 
Snedeker, 2001; Victor, 1993).  During this period, popular daytime television talk 
shows (e.g., Geraldo Rivera, Oprah Winfrey, Sally Jesse Raphael, and Donahue) 
dramatically belabored the supposed existence of a large, clandestine sect of Satanists 
gleefully involved in routine macabre activities, including human sacrifices, animal 
mutilations, desecrations of religious buildings, cannibalism, the distribution of illicit 
drugs, kidnapping, pedophilia, and the production and distribution of child 
pornography (Victor, 1993).  In professional mental health circles, popular therapy 
manuals, such as Bass and Davis’ (1990) The Courage to Heal Workbook, further 
perpetuated dangerous and irresponsible claims, such as the classic assertions, “If you 
are unable to remember any specific instances… but still have a feeling that something 
abusive happened to you, it probably did” (p. 21), and, “If you think you were abused 
and your life shows the symptoms, then you were” (p. 22).  One particular author 
(Cautin, 2011) went so far as to attribute a seismic exacerbation of the research-
practice gap to the recovered memory controversy of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
implying that the overall message of the abovementioned lawsuits (i.e., the public 
portrayal of the sloppy clinician versus the pristine scientist) further injured the 
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already contentious relationship between clinical researchers and practitioners. 
It should be clarified at this point that not all treatments categorized as 
pseudoscientific are necessarily harmful, and not all harmful treatments have the 
trappings of pseudoscience per se.  For examples of the first point, no direct 
deleterious psychological or physical effects have yet been documented for the BSS 
component of EMDR.  Nor have any such effects been observed for TFT, which 
involves lightly tapping meridian points at various locations on the body with one’s 
fingers while voicing positive self-affirmations, the purported goal being to unblock 
thought field “energy” obstructed by trauma (Feinstein, 2008).  As for the second 
point, for a large subset of people experiencing typical bereavement (e.g., dysphoria 
following the death of a close family member), grief counseling appears to be 
associated with a clear deterioration of psychological and behavioral functioning post-
treatment (compared to no treatment) according to a meta-analysis of RCTs 
(Neimeyer, 2000).  However, grief counseling itself does not consist of 
pseudoscientific approaches per se (e.g., fostering social and familial support, 
reinforcing meaning making associated with death, and reflecting on positive 
memories) and may yield more beneficial effects for complicated grief (see 
Allumbaugh & Hoyt, 1999; Altmaier, 2011; Bonanno & Lilienfeld, 2008). 
These considerations aside, practicing clinicians serve their clients best by 
avoiding harm to the extent possible (i.e., when it is foreseeable; APA, 2002) and 
using treatments supported by scientific evidence.  Deferring to personal preferences 
for treatments (e.g., TFT for PTSD) and tenaciously maintaining that a suboptimal 
treatment choice is justified because it has not been shown to be associated with harm 
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arguably constitutes unethical clinical practice, especially when the current state of the 
evidence is ignored.  Unfortunately, however, the current APA Ethics Code (2002) 
explicitly confers equal status to professional judgment and peer-reviewed research 
findings in both clinical practice and pedagogical decisions, which is unjustified given 
the large clinical decision-making literature. 
Clinical Decision Making 
 The clinical method and the actuarial method (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) 
are the two central decision-making methodologies for predicting behavior or 
outcomes in clinical psychology.  The clinical method entails an “in the head” or 
impressionistic synthesis of information to arrive at a conclusion, whereas the 
actuarial method relies on empirically-established relations between information or 
data (e.g., frequencies) and the outcome of interest, which are analyzed formally (e.g., 
using mathematical formulae or tables; Grove & Meehl, 1996) to reach a conclusion 
or probability statement.  Since the mid-twentieth century, literally hundreds of studies 
in the decision-making literature have converged on the conclusion that the actuarial 
method almost always equals or exceeds the clinical method in accuracy (e.g., when 
predicting the presence or absence of a diagnosis), sometimes by a small margin and 
sometimes a considerable margin, and hence is the superior method overall (Goldberg, 
1965; 1968; 1970; Dawes, 1971; Einhorn, 1972; Meehl, 1954; Sawyer, 1966).  This 
clear-cut trend has continued to emerge in meta-analyses as well (e.g., Aegisdóttir et 
al., 2006; Grove et al., 2000). 
It is evident across this vast literature that many applied clinicians either ignore 
or inappropriately countervail readily available actuarial data and instead defer to 
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clinical judgment.  To the author’s knowledge, there are no formal investigations of 
individual cognitive and psychosocial factors undergirding this irrational decisional 
intransigence, although Meyer, Baker, and Baker (2012, March) summarized possible 
misguided epistemological justifications for overreliance on the clinical method.  
These include (but are not limited to) the following: (a) the fallacy of commensurate 
complexity, or the erroneous notion that human behavior is so complex that only 
equally complex methodologies could provide accurate prediction (cf. Faust, 2007); 
(b) the fallacy of argumentum ad experientiam, or stubbornly deferring to one’s own 
self-assumed clinical expertise and experience as the best method for predicting 
outcomes; (c) an illusion of perfect predictability or consistent error avoidance via 
faulty methods, also framed as a steadfast resistance to accepting error to yield less 
error (see Einhorn, 1986); and (d) avowal of the ecumenical decree that no 
controversy exists—one can simply integrate both methods (Grove & Meehl, 1996), 
presumably even if they yield contradictory or mutually incompatible outcomes.  
However, such postulated reasons for resistance to the use of actuarial methods remain 
to be tested and elucidated through a systematic program of research with clinical 
practitioners as the target population. 
Despite the robust limitations of expert clinical judgment, including studies 
illustrating a weak relationship between clinical experience and accuracy8 (see Dawes, 
1989; Lilienfeld et al., 2003), commensurate levels of accuracy among novices and 
experts on a number of judgment tasks (especially when clinicians lack sound 
scientific evidence or ignore it; Goldberg, 1968; Weck, Weigel, Richtberg, & Stangier, 
2011), and observed deterioration of knowledge once the practitioner completes 
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formal education and training (Vollmer, Spada, Caspar, & Burn, 2013), this has not 
stopped many clinical psychology authors from professing an exaggerated faith in 
clinical expertise.  Some even go so far as to declare by fiat that many years of clinical 
experience render one a more effective therapist in the absence of supporting data 
(e.g., Betan & Blinder, 2010).  For example, Overholser (2010) proposed the 
following domains of clinical expertise: (a) possession of a terminal degree in 
psychology, (b) accrual of many years of direct clinical experience administering 
treatments and/or assessments, (c) demonstration of strong clinical skills in specific 
clinical applications, (d) possession of an advanced graduate degree in a relevant 
specialty area, and (e) national visibility in a specific professional community.   
Lamentably, a call for accurate knowledge of the relevant scientific literature 
(and a fortiori, knowledge of effective interventions and their applications) is nowhere 
to be found in this formulation of superior clinical acumen.  Although the present 
author disagrees with the insistence that applied practitioners become involved in 
formal research endeavors (e.g., Marten & Heimberg, 1995), it would be ethically 
indefensible to maintain that they are justified in neglecting to keep abreast of the 
current state of the evidence for relevant assessments and interventions routinely used 
in their clinical practice.  This is especially true given that the estimated half-life of 
knowledge in clinical psychology is approximately 11 years with an anticipated future 
decline to 9 years (Neimeyer, Taylor, Rozensky, & Cox, 2014).  In other words, after 
roughly 9–11 years pass following the completion of their doctoral degree, 50% of 
what psychologists learned in graduate school will become obsolete.  Thus, ironically, 
the very encouraging finding that knowledge is advancing rapidly in psychology is 
 59 
 
potentially offset by the extent to which such knowledge may be routinely disregarded 
or replaced with pseudoscientific or insufficiently validated beliefs. 
With reference to explicit overvaluation of clinical experience and expertise, 
Betan and Binder (2010) recently introduced metabolizing theory, which presumes 
that “expert” therapists differ from novices in that they engage in a flexible, adaptive, 
and accurate intuitive synthesis of theoretical and clinical knowledge outside of 
conscious awareness when formulating case conceptualizations and treating clients.  In 
contrast, novice or non-expert therapists (i.e., those with far fewer years of accrued 
clinical experience) presumably lack a metabolic, intuitive grasp of core concepts.  
Despite their apparently genuine convictions, the authors did not reference a single 
study supporting these bold assertions.  Such assertions are likely better categorized as 
questionable conjecture or hypothesis as opposed to a theory given the absence of 
supporting evidence and the overwhelming presence of negative findings that 
contradict such optimistic pronouncements about the superior levels of accuracy 
achieved through experienced clinical judgment (Garb, 1998).  Strongly worded yet 
evidentially hollow claims of this sort pertaining to clinical expertise may 
inadvertently instill a sense of professional complacency and provide a disincentive to 
keep up with relevant scientific research and/or utilize evidence-based tools. 
All of this is not to say, however, that clinical judgment should be the nemesis 
of applied psychologists.  Clinical intuition, expertise, and judgment play valuable 
roles in the context of discovery (e.g., hypothesis generation) and should not be 
considered second-class given their role in advancing the field (Lilienfeld, 2010; 
Chambless, 2014).  Practitioners who draw from their rich clinical experiences in 
 60 
 
formulating case studies or presentations and subsequently utilize this knowledge to 
propose clear, sensible, and testable hypotheses for future research are constructively 
contributing to the true integration of science and practice (Lowman, 2012).  Some of 
these hypotheses turn out to be correct (or nearly so), and at present, it is difficult to 
conceive of other ways by which novel clinical ideas could be generated.  As a case in 
point, Chambless (2014) recently described how Aaron Beck’s seminal cognitive 
conceptualization of depression began with a series of loose-knit observations of 
dysphoric patients and their reported thought content, which gradually evolved into a 
more streamlined and systematized program of research.  In this same vein, mutually 
informative dialogue between practitioners and researchers may help close the 
widening research-practice gap by having practitioners assist as research “problem 
finders,” whereas researchers would primarily serve as “problem solvers,” although 
these roles blend together for some psychologists (Chambless, 2014; Goldfried et al., 
2014).  Nevertheless, these same mental processes that shape initial clinical 
impressions and fledgling research agendas are certainly not immune from the 
pervasive influence of cognitive biases (e.g., confirmation bias), especially in the 
context of justification (Lilienfeld, 2010). 
Cognitive Characteristics of Clinicians 
As acknowledged in the decision-making literature, clinical psychologists 
routinely face complex and ambiguous scenarios that demand fairly rapid decisions 
about specific courses of action (e.g., diagnosis, suicide and violence risk assessment, 
intervention selection, and prognostic forecasting; Oltmanns & Klonsky, 2007).  
Unfortunately, psychologists in applied practice are rarely given immediate corrective 
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feedback on their decisions about specific scenarios followed by opportunities for 
repeated practice (i.e., deliberate practice; Ericsson, 2005; Lewandowsky, Little, & 
Kalish, 2007), which are known to be invaluable conditions for establishing expert 
levels of decisional accuracy (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005).  An example of a field in 
which perceptual expertise is developed through repeated deliberate practice is 
ornithology, where experts gradually learn how to quickly and accurately identify 
birds at subordinate levels of representation (Krigolson, Pierce, Holroyd, & Tanaka, 
2008).  A skilled ornithologist, for example, would be able to identify an American 
flamingo as belonging to the species Phoenicopterus ruber as rapidly as a novice 
could identify it as a pink flamingo.  In contrast, clinical practitioners typically cannot 
quickly and accurately diagnose a client based on readily observable pathognomonic 
features, not necessarily due to lack of competence, but also attributable to the 
complex heterogeneity of mental illness manifestation9 (Seaton et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, they often lack access to accurate corrective diagnostic feedback in their 
work settings in the same way that an ornithologist could compare observed birds to a 
textbook of representative exemplars, although professional consultation may assist 
with diagnostic accuracy depending on the nature and quality of the feedback.  The 
feedback they do receive often contains a fairly large error component, which can 
greatly diminish the benefits of experience and easily foster mistaken belief (Dawes, 
1989). 
Faced with these environmental pressures (e.g., obstacles to proper experiential 
learning in a fast-paced work environment), clinical psychologists are understandably 
susceptible to a pernicious host of cognitive biases and heuristics, which may result in 
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suboptimal clinical decision-making procedures, overconfidence, an illusion of 
learning, and decreased judgmental accuracy (Arkes, 1981; Dawes, 1994; Dawes et 
al., 1989; see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  As Meehl (1993) more forcefully 
stated, “It is absurd, as well as arrogant, to pretend that acquiring a Ph.D. somehow 
immunizes me from the errors of sampling, perception, recording, retention, retrieval, 
and inference to which the human mind is subject” (pp. 728).  Generally speaking, 
cognitive heuristics can facilitate rapid adaptive choices in an overwhelmingly 
complex world, but they may also muddle perceptions and reinforce false beliefs 
(Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 Cognitive and personologic variables contributing to clinician susceptibility to 
pseudoscientific beliefs are not well researched or formally understood, but it is 
plausible to hypothesize that they do so largely because of the ubiquitous human 
vulnerability to cognitive biases (and, more generally, irrationality) alluded to in 
previous paragraphs10.  For example, following their initial attraction to and utilization 
of pseudoscientific treatments due to whatever combination of biases and proclivities, 
clinicians may subsequently fall into what social psychologist Anthony Pratkanis 
(1995, July/August, p. 21) calls a rationalization trap.  This entails developing a 
gradual personal commitment to (or, stated another way, building an emotional 
investment in) the core principles of the intervention, which may be facilitated by 
various cognitive biases and stressors (e.g., confirmation bias and cognitive 
dissonance).  Of course, cognitive bias susceptibility and illogical thinking may be 
more acutely amplified in some individuals for whatever reasons.  Some studies have 
found, for example, that individuals who believe more strongly in the paranormal tend 
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to commit more logical and probabilistic judgment errors than their more skeptical 
peers (see Majima, 2012). 
Interestingly, in tandem with the rationalization trap, some clinicians may 
become so committed to particular theoretical frameworks that they begin to 
experience the following phenomenology: (a) ownership of their position, (b) 
perceiving their position as an extended part of their self-concept, and (c) subsequently 
perceiving any criticisms of the underlying conceptual and/or evidentiary apparatus as 
an attack on themselves (e.g., akin to an erroneously perceived ad hominem attack; see 
de Dreu & van Knippenberg [2005] for preliminary experimental evidence for this 
possibility).  Involvement with “granfalloons” (Vonnegut, 1973, as cited in Pratkanis, 
1995, July/August, p. 22), or “proud and meaningless” in-groups emphasizing a 
cohesive social identity associated with shared beliefs and jargon, may further 
reinforce wayward clinicians’ commitment to favored interventions and/or theoretical 
frameworks (e.g., see McNally [1999] for a telling description of the EMDR Institute, 
Inc., and its members’ activities).  This may also serve to isolate them from informed 
skeptics by reinforcing perceptions of them as hostile out-group members (Pratkanis, 
1995, July/August). 
 Regrettably, exposure to general higher education alone does not appear to be a 
sufficient buffer against the proliferation of pseudoscientific and paranormal beliefs.  
For example, a paranormal beliefs survey given to 133 allied health students (e.g., 
undergraduate and graduate students in the fields of physical therapy, medical 
technology, and health administration) from two universities (including an Ivy League 
university) revealed the following:  belief in extrasensory perception (46%), perceived 
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legitimacy of chiropractic medicine (36%), and claims of telepathic experiences (25%) 
(Duncan, Donnelly, Nicholson, & Hees, 1992).  However, educational interventions 
targeting domain-specific critical thinking skills do hold promise for mitigating at least 
some influences of faulty reasoning associated with questionable beliefs.  Relative to a 
general psychology undergraduate course, a cooperative learning course specially 
designed to assist students with critically scrutinizing paranormal claims resulted in 
statistically meaningful gains in abilities to detect and analyze reasoning flaws (d = 
1.2) as well as generate rival alternative scientific explanations for phenomena of 
interest (d = .84) (Wesp & Montgomery, 1998).  Additionally, significant reductions 
in paranormal beliefs found among students in an undergraduate science seminar and a 
pseudoscience seminar (compared to a quasi-control group) were maintained over a 2-
year period following the end of the courses (Dougherty, 2004; Morier & Keeports, 
1994).  Perhaps similar improvements might be attained were clinical psychologists 
exposed to educational interventions designed to strengthen relevant critical thinking 
skills and the ability to differentiate scientific from pseudoscientific therapeutic 
claims, although this has yet to be formally tested. 
Baker and colleagues (2008) argued that the following characteristics of 
practicing clinical psychologists contribute to their professional ostracization (i.e., 
being “crowded out” of mental health service delivery by primary care physicians and 
Masters-level clinicians) and overall weak impact on modern healthcare: (a) 
overvaluation of clinical experience at the expense of weighing available scientific 
evidence, (b) persistent use of poorly supported interventions in place of well-
supported ones, (c) lack of adequate education and training in scientific foundations, 
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and (d) ambivalent feelings about science and its utility in applied clinical psychology.  
Of note, factors “a” (intuitive decision-making preferences) and “d” (ambivalence or, 
in some cases, hostility toward science) in particular have been repeated foci of 
discussion in the pseudoscience literature in clinical psychology (Lilienfeld, Lynn, & 
Lohr, 2003) and speak to important cognitive-emotional preferences of applied 
psychologists.  However, as Garb and Boyle (2003, p. 30) noted, no studies to their 
knowledge (or the current author’s knowledge) have attempted to qualitatively or 
quantitatively investigate these features, especially as they relate to specific behavioral 
consequences (e.g., the aforementioned factors “b” and “c”) pertinent to professionally 
and ethically responsible mental health care. 
In addition, apart from a small number of recent surveys, which are limited in 
scope (e.g., Sharp et al., 2008), there is limited understanding of how critical thinking 
skills and cognitive styles relevant to clinical decision-making relate to knowledge 
about evidence-based and pseudoscientific treatments.  These variables are worthy of 
further research given the proliferation of highly questionable and, in many cases, 
suboptimal interventions offered to mental health clients.  As Lilienfeld (2010, p. 283) 
noted in his review of the treatment literature, which is only a small snapshot of the 
pervasiveness of the problem at hand, (a) tens of thousands of clinicians have received 
EMDR training (cf. Bower, 1995; Shapiro, 2004); (b) most clients suffering from 
anxiety, mood, eating, and autism spectrum disorders do not receive scientifically 
supported psychotherapies, and (c) increasing numbers of clients suffering from 
mental illness receive unsupported and questionable interventions, such as “energy 
therapies” (e.g., TFT).  Although a number of studies lend credence to the claim that 
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poor critical and scientific thinking skills are associated with stronger beliefs in 
pseudoscience and superstition among high school and college-age students (e.g., 
Bennett, 1991; McKenzie, 1986), this has yet to be examined among applied 
psychologists in active clinical practice. 
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
Given the absence of an existing measure, the primary objective of this study 
was to develop a questionnaire (viz., the Clinical Attitudes and Knowledge 
Questionnaire, or CAKQ; see “Part B” of the Appendix) intended to appraise specific 
clinical knowledge domains and attitudes toward science among licensed, doctoral-
level practitioners of clinical psychology.  This aim was pursued through generating 
an initial item pool designed to detect the presence of knowledge pertaining to (a) 
legitimate as well as questionable treatment techniques used in contemporary clinical 
practice (e.g., evidence-based versus poorly supported or, from some perspectives, 
pseudoscientific approaches [see Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2003]); (b) relevant 
clinical psychology research areas (e.g., current controversies that impact applied 
practice); and (c) clinical judgment and decision-making procedures.  A preliminary 
scale consisting of items addressing practitioner attitudes toward science in clinical 
psychology was also created.  A secondary study aim was to ascertain whether 
psychologists’ professed knowledge varied in relation to years involved in clinical 
practice.  Preliminary questionnaire data were collected from practicing clinical 
psychologists in various professional settings and analyzed to examine relationships 
among clinical knowledge and relevant cognitive variables. 
As this dissertation is the first study of this new questionnaire, direct research 
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evidence on its latent structure was lacking.  Hence, hypotheses were generated based 
on general themes of item parcels.  Excluding the attitudes toward science items from 
statistical analyses, it was hypothesized (Hypothesis 1) that a four-component (or, 
alternatively, factor) solution would best summarize the data (i.e., knowledge of 
pseudoscientific interventions, evidence-based interventions, general clinical research, 
and clinical judgment/decision making). 
Regarding the predicted nature of relationships among clinical knowledge and 
relevant cognitive and information processing variables (i.e., intuitive processing 
styles and critical thinking skills), it was hypothesized (Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
respectively) that higher scores on the CAKQ (i.e., greater accuracy in answering 
questions relevant to the research areas listed above) would be significantly associated 
with (a) higher scores on inference, deduction, and interpretation tasks, and (b) a lower 
reliance on intuitive thinking styles.  Finally, it was hypothesized (Hypothesis 4) that 
clinical knowledge would not significantly vary as a function of clinical experience 
across participants (i.e., more years of clinical experience would not be associated 
with higher CAKQ scores). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
Two thousand randomly selected licensed psychologists currently engaged in 
clinical practice in New England were invited to participate in the study.  Inclusion 
criteria included: (a) current licensure to practice psychotherapy in a New England 
state; (b) possession of a doctorate in the field of psychology (e.g., Ph.D. or Psy.D.), 
education (e.g., Ed.D.), science (e.g., Sc.D.), or other related field; (c) current active 
involvement in clinical practice (e.g., not retired or exclusively involved in research); 
and (d) the ability to read, write, and understand English. 
Of the 2,000 questionnaires mailed, 345 surveys were returned completed in 
full or part (see further below for details).  In addition, 126 unopened survey packets 
were received by return mail, indicating outdated practitioner addresses (e.g., 
practitioners who had relocated or were deceased as noted on the envelopes), and 12 
psychologists contacted the student investigator directly by telephone or email to 
decline participation for various reasons (e.g., they were retired, no longer in applied 
clinical practice, no longer licensed, or did not have time to complete the survey).   
Among the 345 individuals who returned surveys, 335 were currently 
practicing licensed psychologists, and 10 were retired psychologists no longer in 
applied practice.  Eleven of the 335 surveys returned by current practitioners were 
excluded from the database due to varying degrees of incompleteness, which ranged 
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from blank surveys to the omission of entire sets of questions needed for statistical 
analyses.  Thus, excluding unopened surveys that apparently never reached invited 
psychologists (n = 126), a total response rate of 19% (or 357 out of 1,874) was 
achieved with a survey return rate of 18% (345 out of 1,874).  Of note, 94% of 
returned surveys (or 324 out of 345) contained usable data.  Hence, the total return rate 
for usable surveys was 17% (or 324 out of 1,874). 
Participants included in this study were 324 licensed psychologists in New 
England engaged in at least one hour of applied clinical practice (i.e., assessment or 
treatment) weekly throughout the past year (range = 1 to 100 weekly hours; M = 
24.84, SD = 12.41).  Numbers of participating psychologists by state were as follows: 
Massachusetts, n = 135 (42%); Connecticut, n = 63 (19%); Rhode Island, n = 51 
(16%); Vermont, n = 31 (9%); New Hampshire, n = 25 (8%); and Maine, n = 19 (6%).  
Total years of post-graduate clinical service ranged from 3 to 57 (M = 21.91, SD = 
11.06).  The mean age of respondents was 55.36 years (SD = 12.80) with females (n = 
189) making up the majority of the sample (58%).  The vast majority (95%) of 
participants identified as Caucasian, 2% did not disclose their race, 1% identified as 
Asian, less than 1% as Black or African American, less than 1% as American Indian 
or Alaskan Native, and 1% as Hispanic or Latino.  Nearly all (99%) of participants 
spoke English as a first language, and 94% of participants were born in the United 
States. 
Regarding credentials, the majority of the sample (69%) reported having 
earned a Ph.D., 24% reported holding a Psy.D., 7% reported holding an Ed.D., and 
one participant reported having a Doctor of Ministry (D.Min.) degree.  Most (78%) 
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doctoral degrees were in clinical psychology, followed by counseling psychology 
(15%), school psychology (4%), educational psychology (2%), and neuropsychology 
(1%).  Ninety percent of the sample indicated that their graduate programs were APA-
accredited, and nearly all of the remaining 10% reported Council for Accreditation of 
Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP) accreditation.  With 
reference to clinical settings in which respondents reported conducting most of their 
applied work, private or independent practice was most heavily represented (68%), 
and a cognitive-behavioral theoretical approach was most frequently endorsed (42%) 
within the sample (see Table 1 for a more detailed summary of demographic and 
professional characteristics of participants). 
Measures 
Clinical Attitudes and Knowledge Questionnaire (CAKQ).  This newly 
developed questionnaire, the first of its kind to the best of the author’s knowledge, was 
designed to quantify the nature of clinical knowledge and belief among licensed 
mental health practitioners.  The initial version of the CAKQ consisted of 38 questions 
rated along a five-point Likert-type scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree,” 3 = “Neither 
Agree Nor Disagree,” and 5 = “Strongly Agree.”  In addition, a response option of 
“Not Familiar” (NF) was provided in the event that respondents were unfamiliar with 
specific topics covered by items.  Question content was relevant to applied clinical 
practice and covered five general themes, including knowledge about the research 
status of evidence-based treatment modalities (eight questions, e.g., “Psychological 
research has established cognitive-behavioral therapy [CBT] as an efficacious 
intervention for social anxiety disorder”), knowledge about the status of interventions 
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deemed pseudoscientific in the current literature (eight questions, e.g., “Past life 
regression is useful for identifying clients’ traumatic memories prior to their birth”), 
degree of familiarity with relevant areas of the broader clinical research literature 
(nine questions, e.g., “Psychotherapists, even when well intentioned, may 
unknowingly mislead clients into integrating completely fabricated events [i.e., false 
memories] into their personal histories”), knowledge about clinical judgment and 
decision making (eight questions, e.g., “Maximizing the accuracy of clinical 
judgments depends on integrating most or all of the available data”), and attitudes 
toward science in clinical psychology (five items, e.g., “Most of the soundest bases for 
knowledge in psychology rest on scientific studies and advances”). 
 Comprehensive edited volumes focusing on evidence-based (e.g., Chambless 
et al., 1998; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Lambert, 2013) and pseudoscientific 
clinical practices (e.g., Faust, 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2003; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & 
Beyerstein, 2010; Lilienfeld et al., 2008) as well as a review of the general literature 
on these topics provided the basis for item content and design.  Knowledge about the 
research status of clinical decision-making practices was considered equally important 
in this context given the pervasiveness of false beliefs about clinical versus actuarial 
judgment and potential repercussions for clinical practice (see Dawes, 1994; Dawes et 
al., 1989; Meehl, 1954).  Specific treatment techniques were included based on 
persistence of use among practitioners (despite lack of evidence and/or contrary 
evidence for their effectiveness for specified purposes) and apparent public popularity 
according to the literature.  For example, approximately 25% of American and 
Canadian psychotherapists regularly use questionable methods like hypnosis and 
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dream interpretation (as cited in Lilienfeld et al., 2008, p. 25), and substantially more 
public attention is garnered by highly questionable clinical techniques, such as past-
life regression, TFT, and rebirthing vis-à-vis more evidence-based practices (Olatunji, 
Parker, & Lohr, 2006). 
 Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI): Selected Items.  The REI is a 
widely used questionnaire validated for differentiating rational and intuitive thinking 
styles (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  All items 
are rated along a five-point Likert-type scale where 1 = “Definitely False,” 3 = 
“Undecided or Equally True and False,” and 5 = “Definitely True.”  The REI contains 
two negligibly correlated scales: Rationality (formerly the Need for Cognition scale), 
which measures rational thinking preferences (e.g., “I prefer complex problems to 
simple problems”), and Experientiality (formerly the Faith in Intuition scale), which 
assesses more intuitive thinking styles (e.g., “I believe in trusting my hunches”).  To 
reduce questionnaire length, the present study included five items from the 
Experiential Ability (EA; α  = .80) subscale of the Experientiality scale, which refers 
to perceiving oneself as having sophisticated intuitive skills (e.g., “I hardly ever go 
wrong when I listen to my deepest ‘gut feelings’ to find an answer”); and five items 
from the Experiential Engagement (EE; α  = .79) subscale of the Experientiality scale, 
which refers to a preference for and enjoyment of intuitive decision making (e.g., “I 
like to rely on my intuitive impressions”) (EA-EE subscale inter-correlation = .62).  
These items were selected on the basis of the magnitude of item-total correlations 
(range of rs = .47 to .73; Björklund & Bäckström, 2008), magnitude of respective 
factor loadings (range = .50 to .66; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), and their perceived 
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relevance to intuitive clinical decision making.  Questionnaire instructions were 
slightly modified to associate each item with clinical practice activities. 
 Critical Thinking Questionnaire (CTQ).  The CTQ was designed to evaluate 
practicing psychotherapists’ critical thinking abilities (Gaudiano, et al., 2011; 2012; 
Sharp et al., 2008).  It consists of 28 items with multiple-choice format response scales 
and has a total score range of 0 to 28; total scores are calculated by summing the 
number of correct responses.  Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (KR20) estimates of 
internal consistency appear adequate (KR20 = .70; Sharp et al., 2008), although 
additional psychometric evaluation is needed.  Of the five CTQ subscales, three were 
selected for the current study (viz., Inference, Deduction, and Interpretation, 
comprising 14 items total) in light of (a) Sharp et al.’s (2008) observation that 
Deduction (4 items) and Interpretation (7 items) best differentiated psychotherapists’ 
critical thinking practices, (b) the high clinical relevance of the Inference questions (3 
items), and (c) concerns about the overall length of the current questionnaire packet.  
Inference questions challenge respondents to discern degrees of accuracy of inferences 
drawn from available data, Deduction problems test the ability to ascertain whether 
certain conclusions necessarily follow from given premises, and Interpretation 
questions require drawing accurate conclusions and generalizations upon weighing 
available evidence (Sharp et al., 2008).  Of note, most CTQ questions originally 
appeared in two well-validated critical thinking measures—the Watson-Glaser Critical 
Thinking Assessment (Watson & Glaser, 1994) and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test 
(Ennis, Millman, & Tomko, 1985).  Two Inference subscale items were adapted from 
Stanovich’s (2003) textbook on critical thinking. 
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Procedure 
Prior to participant recruitment, the initial CAKQ item pool was distributed to 
four nationally recognized psychologists with scholarly expertise in the delineation of 
scientific from pseudoscientific subject matter in clinical psychology.  All four experts 
provided feedback in the form of suggested item revisions, new items for 
consideration, and suggested item omissions.  No explicit conflicting feedback was 
observed among experts, and virtually all of their suggestions were incorporated into 
the revised questionnaire with the close guidance of the author’s mentor, who has a 
strong background in the decision-making literature.  In accordance with expert 
feedback, three new items were added to the final version of the CAKQ (i.e., one item 
to the evidence-based treatment category, one item to the pseudoscientific intervention 
category, and one item to the clinical judgment category), and four items in the 
general clinical knowledge category pertinent to scientifically under-supported 
assessment practices (e.g., use of graphology and Draw-A-Person test) were 
eliminated and replaced with four questions reflecting more general content (e.g., 
“Most, if not all, major psychopathology ultimately has its roots in low self-esteem”).  
The latter change was made in light of the observation that potentially pseudoscientific 
assessment practices comprise a separate domain of inquiry that is equally as complex 
as the intervention topic, and studying clinician knowledge of such practices was 
deemed best reserved for a future study.  Thus, the final version of the CAKQ 
contained 41 items. 
In light of the reliance of previous research on online listservs (i.e., e-mail 
advertisements) and membership rosters associated with professional psychological 
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organizations (e.g., Gaudiano et al., 2011; 2012; Sharp et al., 2008), this study 
attempted to reduce sampling error by recruiting participants from the northeastern 
U.S. irrespective of professional membership status.  New England was specifically 
chosen for recruitment due to the known effects of physical proximity and 
personalization on survey return rates (i.e., the location of University of Rhode Island 
[URI] in a New England state and the personal relevance of practicing psychology in 
the Northeast; see Green & Kvidahl, 1989; Heerwegh, Vanhove, Matthijs, & 
Loosveldt, 2005; Sonne-Holm, Sørensen, Jensen, & Schnohr, 1989).  Additionally, 
only a few studies to date (e.g., Hipol & Deacon, 2012) have focused on clinicians 
within specific geographic regions of the U.S. 
A sample of potential research participants was identified using computer 
databases obtained from all six New England state boards of professional licensure.  
The number of randomly selected participants from each state database was 
proportional to the documented number of licensed psychologists actively practicing 
in each state, specifically, 160 from Rhode Island, 1,040 from Massachusetts, 360 
from Connecticut, 160 from Vermont, 160 from New Hampshire, and 120 from Maine 
(N = 2,000).  Most databases were freely downloadable from state licensure board 
websites, although two states required formal written requests (viz., Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts), and one state required a fee (viz., Massachusetts).  The expected 
response rate was approximately 20% (actual response rate = 19%).  This estimation 
was based on postal survey response rates of licensed mental health professionals 
reported in the literature, with doctoral-level practitioners being among the more 
responsive participants (see Michalski & Kohout, 2011; Sharp et al., 2008). 
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An explanatory cover letter, URI Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved 
informed consent form, paper questionnaire packet (see Appendix), and pre-stamped 
return envelope were sent to invited participants’ mailing addresses via U.S. Post 
Office First-Class Mail.  All returned packets were screened for degree of completion 
and adherence to inclusion criteria (e.g., checking weekly clinical hours and 
respondents’ hand-written notes for indications of retirement).  Questionnaire data 
were entered into an SPSS Statistics 22.0 database for statistical analyses (see Data 
Analysis section below for details). 
Data Analysis 
Data from 324 participants were used for all statistical analyses.  All but five 
CAKQ items were included in the analyses (n = 36 items).  The five excluded items 
comprised the attitudes toward science category, which elicited personal attitudes 
(versus research-corroborated knowledge) and were not included in the hypotheses of 
the current study.  Prior to conducting the primary statistical analyses, 17 CAKQ items 
were recoded such that higher scores reflected greater knowledge of relevant clinical 
research, 4 REI items were recoded such that higher scores indicated a greater 
preference for intuitive decision making, and missing data frequencies were obtained 
for all study questionnaires (see Appendix for specific examples of recoded items).  In 
addition, frequencies were obtained for NF responses on the CAKQ.  NF responses 
were treated as missing data given that these responses were distinct from the CAKQ 
Likert scale options and thus were not accounted for by the metric of the provided 
response scale, and idiographic-level (i.e., participant-specific) NF rationales were not 
obtained in this study due to time and resource constraints.   
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The following procedures were subsequently used to evaluate whether NF 
responses in the CAKQ were best characterized as missing at random (MAR) or 
missing completely at random (MCAR)11 (for technical details, see Enders, 2010; 
Rubin, 1976).  First, a multiple regression analysis (MRA) was performed to ascertain 
whether demographic and professional background variables significantly predicted 
total NF responses across participants.  Second, Little’s (1988) MCAR test was 
conducted as an omnibus test of randomness to judge whether NF responses plus the 
small amount of non-NF missing data could be collectively classified as MCAR (i.e., 
comparing expected data patterns from a random missing data process to observed 
missing data patterns).  Deciphering the degree of randomness present in missing data 
has important implications for judging whether data are sufficiently random to 
accommodate specific remedial techniques, such as maximum likelihood estimation in 
the event of non-randomness/MAR, or a family of missing data imputation approaches 
if MCAR holds (e.g., mean substitution, regression imputation, hot or cold deck 
imputation, and multiple imputation) (Little & Rubin, 1987). 
Next, a preliminary investigation of the dimensionality of the CAKQ was 
conducted using principal components analysis (PCA).  Of note, the final sample size 
was not sufficiently large to allow a random division into equivalent subsamples (ns = 
162) for cross-validation purposes (e.g., using a combinatory exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analytic approach with structural equation modeling would be 
inadequately powered and requires larger sample sizes; cf. Brown, 2006).  The PCA 
was conducted in SPSS 22.0 using oblique rotation.  Scree test results, solution 
interpretability, and strength of parameter estimates (i.e., component loadings > .30) 
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guided component selection and acceptability.  Salient cross-loadings (i.e., > .30) were 
also identified.  Following the PCA, a standard MRA was used to test hypothesized 
relationships between the CAKQ total score (outcome variable) and the 
cognitive/information processing variables—the REI total scores and CTQ domains 
(predictor variables).  Finally, a simple linear regression analysis was used to 
determine whether reported years of clinical experience significantly predicted CAKQ 
total scores. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
CAKQ Response Frequencies and Characteristics 
 Prior to recoding of CAKQ items, the Likert-scale response frequencies for 
each item were computed and are presented in Table 2.  In addition, an alternative 
scoring procedure was carried out wherein responses to CAKQ items (n = 36) were 
coded either “correct” or “incorrect” in accordance with contemporary clinical 
research findings (see Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; Faust, 2012; Lambert, 2013; 
Lilienfeld et al., 2003 for reviews relevant to specific item content).  Specifically, if 
participants (a) responded with either “Strongly Disagree” or “Somewhat Disagree” to 
scientifically unsubstantiated statements (e.g., “Past life regression is useful for 
identifying clients’ traumatic memories prior to their birth”); or (b) responded with 
either “Strongly Agree” or “Somewhat Agree” to scientifically supported statements 
(e.g., “Exposure plus response prevention [ERP] is an effective psychological 
treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder [OCD]”), their responses were considered 
“correct” and coded as 1s.  Responses in the incorrect direction (e.g., either strongly or 
somewhat agreeing or disagreeing with scientifically unsubstantiated or substantiated 
statements, respectively), responses of “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” NF responses, 
and missing data were all counted as “incorrect” and coded as 0s.  Total CAKQ scores 
were subsequently computed by summing the number of correct responses across the 
36 items for each participant.  The CAKQ total score binomial distribution appeared 
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mesokurtic (G2 = –.10) with no substantial skewness (G1 = 0.20) noted.   
 Using the alternative scoring system, the mean CAKQ total score was 17.84 
(SD = 4.87) out of a total possible score of 36 (i.e., an average score of 50% correct).  
The most frequently correctly answered item was: “Psychological research has 
established cognitive-behavioral therapy [CBT] as an efficacious intervention for 
social anxiety disorder” (92% correct), and the most frequently incorrectly answered 
item was: “Maximizing the accuracy of clinical judgments depends on integrating 
most or all of the available data (e.g., clinical observations, test results, interview data, 
etc.)” (3% correct).  Overall, participants evidenced disproportionately poorer 
performance on clinical judgment (i.e., range of correct responses = 3% to 58%) and 
pseudoscience items (range correct = 15% to 73%) compared to evidence-based 
treatment (range correct = 36% to 92%) and general clinical knowledge items (range 
correct = 12% to 83%).  However, it is important to recognize that 4 items with some 
of the highest NF response rates (i.e., four pseudoscience items and one general 
clinical knowledge item; NF response range = 109 to 186) were represented among 
the 10 most frequently incorrectly answered items (range correct = 3% to 27%).  Thus, 
counting NF responses as incorrect may have rendered this particular scoring system 
overly punitive, which is why alternative procedures for handling these responses 
were subsequently considered12. 
Missing Data and “Not Familiar” Response Analysis 
 Missing data frequencies were reviewed for the abbreviated CTQ (n = 14 
items), the REI (n = 10 items), and for the CAKQ items included in the statistical 
analyses (n = 36).  Across all participants, no CTQ responses were missing, 3 REI 
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responses (< 0.1%) were missing, and 21 CAKQ responses (0.2%) were missing.  
Thus, missing responses alone were not deemed a major concern. 
 NF responses were next analyzed for the CAKQ.  NF responses comprised 
15% of all CAKQ data collected, with 82% (n = 267) of all participants providing at 
least one NF response and 97% of all remaining CAKQ items (n = 35) having at least 
one NF response.  Given this observation, a Pareto chart of the 36 CAKQ items (see 
Figure 1 for the bar chart and Table 2 for NF response frequencies for each item) was 
requested to gather additional descriptive information (i.e., to ascertain whether certain 
items elicited more NF responses relative to other items).  Visual inspection of the 
Pareto chart revealed that items containing pseudoscientific content appeared to elicit 
disproportionately more NF responses relative to other items (i.e., NF frequency range 
= 41 to 187, or 45% of all NFs), whereas clinical judgment items garnered 
disproportionately fewer NF responses (i.e., NF range = 0 to 38, or 0.1% of all NFs).  
However, NF responses to EBT (range = 2 to 144, or 27% of all NFs) and general 
clinical knowledge (range = 4 to 133, or 19% of all NFs) items appeared more evenly 
distributed. 
 To explore the possibility of similar NF patterns emerging within specific sub-
groups of participants, a standard MRA was conducted with total NF responses (i.e., 
summed across all items for each participant) as the criterion and theoretical 
orientation, degree field, highest degree earned, and total years of clinical experience 
as predictor variables13.  The overall regression model did not significantly predict NF 
responses, and the effect size was negligible (R2 < .01).  This finding, in conjunction 
with the non-significant result obtained from Little’s MCAR test, indicate that CAKQ 
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NF responses may be justifiably classified as sufficiently (albeit not necessarily 
categorically) MCAR (i.e., no distinguishable differences were detected across 
participants with differing NF response rates, at least insofar as can be deciphered 
from demographic and professional background variables measured in this study).  
Thus, imputation procedures were deemed appropriate for addressing NF responses, 
and a standard (i.e., ordinary least squares) regression imputation (i.e., conditional 
mean imputation; Buck, 1960)14 was utilized to address missing values and NF 
responses among the CAKQ data.  Total scores were subsequently computed for 
regression-imputed CAKQ scores15. 
With regard to an analysis of outliers among total NF scores, one case had a 
studentized residual of 3.26 (studentized deleted residual = 3.31), and seven cases 
evidenced Mahalanobis distances greater than 30 (D2 values = 33 to 68).  However, a 
review of these individual cases did not reveal any consistent features (e.g., relatively 
heterogeneous demographics, professional concentrations, years of experience, 
theoretical orientations, CTQ scores, and REI scores were observed).  In addition, 
removing these cases and re-running the MRA did not yield meaningfully discrepant 
results. 
Internal Consistency Estimates and Item-Total Correlations 
Internal consistency estimates computed for the CAKQ (Likert-scale scores) 
and REI were adequate (Cronbach’s αs = .76 and .88, respectively).  Scale reliability 
for the CTQ, however, was poor (KR20 = .62) relative to previous estimates (e.g., 
Sharp et al., 2008), and correlations among subscales (i.e., Inference, Interpretation, 
and Deduction) were relatively small in magnitude (rs = .24 to .28).  Corrected item-
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total correlations (i.e., with individual item values subtracted from the total score) 
ranged from negligible to moderate (rs = .022 to .41).  For a complete listing of scale 
means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations, see Table 3. 
Principal Components Analysis and Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 A PCA was performed on the CAKQ Likert-scale scores for the purposes of 
(a) seeking further justification for the use of a total score in subsequent analyses, and 
(b) preliminarily testing for the presence of the four hypothesized content categories 
(viz., pseudoscience, clinical judgment, evidence-based treatments, and general 
clinical knowledge).  In light of the strength of observed CAKQ inter-scale and 
subscale-total score correlations (i.e., hypothesized scales moderately-to-strongly 
correlating with one another, rs = .20 to .60, as well as with total scores, rs = .50 to 
.80), an oblique (i.e., direct oblimin) rotation was selected.  Scree test results indicated 
a possible two-component solution with observed eigenvalues as follows:  5.1, 2.4, 
1.6, and 1.5 (variance explained = 14%, 7%, 5%, and 4%, respectively).  However, the 
resulting pattern matrix revealed a largely uninterpretable solution as evidenced by 
inconsistent themes among within-component items (i.e., items 9, 13, 17, 20, 26, and 
35 for component 1 and items 18, 20, 21, and 25 for component 2) as well as an 
abundance of salient (i.e., > .30) cross-loadings (range = .31 to .72).  Based on these 
results, further examination of dimensionality was not pursued at this time, and the use 
of the CAKQ total score was deemed appropriate for subsequent analyses given the 
apparent absence of evidence for initially hypothesized CAKQ sub-domains within 
this sample. 
 An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was next conducted on the 10-item REI 
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for the purposes of (a) investigating the appropriateness of using subscale or total 
scores in subsequent analyses, and (b) corroborating the two-component (i.e., EE and 
EA) solution observed in the literature (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999) using principal 
axis factoring.  Oblique rotation (viz., direct oblimin) was used given the strong 
observed EE-EA inter-scale correlation (r = .70, p < .001).  Factor selection and 
acceptability were guided by the scree test, solution interpretability, and strength of 
parameter estimates (i.e., primary factor loadings > .30).  Scree test results clearly 
suggested a two-factor solution.  Eigenvalues for the unreduced correlation matrix 
were as follows:  4.8, 1.0, .77, and .71 (variance explained = 48%, 10%, 8%, and 7%, 
respectively).  Primary factor loadings for all 10 items were well above .30 (range = 
.46 to .80), no salient cross-loadings emerged, and the inter-factor correlation was 
strong (r = .71).  The pattern matrix indicated that all EE items (i.e., REI items 6–10) 
loaded onto the first factor, and all but one EA item (i.e., REI item 3, which also 
loaded onto the first factor) loaded onto the second factor (see Table 4 for item means, 
standard deviations, factor loadings, and communalities).  In view of the high EE-EA 
inter-factor correlation and their strong associations with the REI total score (rs = .93 
and .90, respectively), the REI total score was used in subsequent analyses. 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
 Two separate standard MRAs were conducted to determine how well intuitive 
preferences, critical thinking skills, and number of years of clinical experience 
predicted clinical knowledge.  CAKQ Likert-scale total scores (with regression 
imputation applied to NF and missing data responses prior to summation) served as 
the outcome variable in both analyses.  In the first analysis, predictor variables were 
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REI total scores and CTQ subscale scores (i.e., Inference, Interpretation, and 
Deduction), which significantly predicted CAKQ scores, R2 = .23 (adjusted R2 = .22), 
F(4, 316) = 23.51, p < .001.  Both REI total and the Inference subscale of the CTQ 
made significant contributions to the regression model, t(316) = –7.48, p < .001 (β = –
.38), and t(316) = 3.01, p = .003 (β = .16), respectively.  However, the Interpretation 
and Deduction subscales of the CTQ were not significant predictors (see Table 5 for a 
summary of regression results).  Finally, the second MRA revealed that years of 
clinical experience did not significantly predict CAKQ scores, and the effect size was 
negligible (i.e., R2 < .01). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This study served as a preliminary investigation of the clinical research 
knowledge base16 of licensed psychologists in applied practice in New England using a 
newly developed questionnaire.  Knowledge of specific clinical domains was also 
examined in relation to critical thinking skills and information processing styles.  
Relevant statistical analyses indicated that the initial hypotheses were partially 
supported.  The hypothesis that a four-component solution (i.e., knowledge of 
pseudoscientific treatments, evidence-based treatments, general/miscellaneous clinical 
research, and clinical decision making) would best summarize the CAKQ data was not 
supported by PCA results.  Specifically, the substantive meaning of the two 
components accounting for the most variance (i.e., 21%) was unclear.  Various items 
associated with pseudoscientific, evidence-based, and general knowledge content 
areas loaded onto the first component, and mixed items pertaining to evidence-based 
practices and general clinical knowledge loaded onto the second component.   
Of note, although minor thematic consistency (i.e., memory-related 
phenomena) was detected among items 9 and 26, this was deemed insufficient for 
extrapolating a coherent conceptual understanding from the first component.  A 
possible reason for items failing to load onto their respective anticipated heuristic 
categories is inconsistency of clinician knowledge within the proposed domains.  For 
example, on average, most clinicians may have been fairly knowledgeable about 
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specific kinds of EBTs, but endorsed patterns of EBT knowledge were variable both 
within individual clinician response sets as well as across different clinicians in the 
sample.  This particular hypothesis thus may be inappropriate for future CAKQ studies 
given the observed lack of knowledge cohesion within clinical content areas.  These 
results notwithstanding, PCA results preliminarily supported the use of a CAKQ total 
summed score given the apparent unidimensional nature of overall questionnaire 
responses, although more sophisticated statistical strategies (e.g., Rasch modeling 
within an item response theory framework; Yu, Popp, DiGangi, & Jannasch-Pennell, 
2007) are better suited for addressing this issue. 
 The hypothesized relationship between clinical knowledge and critical thinking 
skills was partially supported.  That is, higher CAKQ scores (and thus greater 
familiarity with the current state of clinical research findings) were significantly 
associated with higher Inference, but not Interpretation or Deduction, subscale scores 
on the CTQ.  The positive relationship between critical inferential thinking skills and 
better knowledge of research-supported and under-supported interventions is no 
surprise; the ability to draw warranted inferences when reviewing scientific literature 
obviously contributes to building an accurate clinical knowledge base.  The high 
clinical relevance of the three CTQ Inference questions likely also contributed to the 
prediction of CAKQ scores.  The Deduction and Interpretation questions, however, 
may have involved critical thinking skills less relevant to clinical knowledge building 
(e.g., perhaps deduction and interpretation are less commonly utilized when reviewing 
research articles, attending workshops, and/or reading textbooks, in which authors and 
speakers typically draw generalizations and conclusions for professional consumers). 
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 Consistent with expectations, a lower reliance on intuitive thinking styles (as 
measured by the total REI score) was associated with greater clinical knowledge.  This 
in part may reflect an incompatibility between overreliance on “gut-level” intuitive 
judgments and deference to and/or affinity for seeking out relevant scientific research 
findings.  For example, more intuitively inclined practitioners may be more naturally 
likely to trust their initial subjective judgments about newly encountered treatments 
and clinical claims, which may dampen motivation to obtain updated knowledge from 
contemporary research.  Finally, the hypothesis that total number of years of clinical 
experience would not predict higher clinical knowledge scores was also upheld.  This 
finding is consistent with previous research indicating that amount of hands-on clinical 
experience is all too often negligibly (if at all) related to professional competency 
(e.g., Goldberg, 1968; Lilienfeld et al., 2003; Vollmer et al., 2013; Weck et al., 2011). 
 With regard to the CAKQ NF response distribution (see Figure 1), participants 
generally indicated low levels of familiarity with (or perhaps were less confident in 
providing clear responses to) items addressing dubious clinical treatments (e.g., TFT 
and NLP) in contrast to high levels of familiarity with items tapping clinical judgment 
processes.  The former observation may be partly explained by lower mainstream 
clinical practitioner exposure to pseudoscientific interventions than previously 
surmised (e.g., Olatunji et al., 2006).  That is, many practitioners may be ignoring such 
approaches (or simply not reading about or otherwise researching them) for a variety 
of reasons, such as skepticism, lack of interest, lack of perceived applicability to 
individual professional practices, and/or feeling as if they already have a grasp of a 
sufficient repertoire of helpful therapeutic techniques.  Another possibility is that 
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many practitioners simply may not have been exposed to the pseudoscience literature 
given its relatively narrow niche in clinical psychology when compared to other 
widely known lines of scholarly inquiry (e.g., EBTs). 
 Professed familiarity with clinical judgment content (as judged by 
disproportionately fewer NF responses to these items relative to other items) is not 
surprising in light of the previously cited decision-making literature, which reveals 
consistent themes of practitioner overconfidence in empirically under-supported or 
suboptimal clinical decisional strategies.  Current results suggest that self-perceived 
familiarity with clinical judgment content in particular is by no means a trustworthy 
proxy for accuracy of knowledge about clinical judgment, especially its well-
researched limitations.  For example, despite considerable contrary evidence (e.g., see 
Grove et al., 2000; Sawyer, 1966), 94% of the sample agreed with the following 
claim:  “Maximizing the accuracy of clinical judgments depends on integrating most 
or all of the available data (e.g., clinical observations, test results, interview data, 
etc.).” 
 A number of study limitations warrant attention.  First, regarding demographic 
characteristics, the sample was predominantly comprised of older (i.e., 64% between 
51 and 99 years of age) Caucasian (95%) psychologists in private or independent 
practice (68%), which limits the generalizability of results across different age, racial, 
and professional groups.  Additional scale validation efforts should attempt to draw 
from more demographically and professionally diverse samples.  Second, the 
professional background portion of the demographics questionnaire did not include a 
question about primary professional activities (e.g., which specific assessments and/or 
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interventions do practitioners spend most of their time conducting and with which 
particular clinical populations?).  It was thus not possible to address questions about 
the uniform relevance of CAKQ content across participants with different professional 
foci and specializations.  A third limitation was the use of abbreviated cognitive 
measures due to concerns about overall questionnaire length.  Observed attenuations 
of scale reliabilities were most likely attributable to the substantially shortened 
versions of the REI and CTQ, and a more comprehensive assessment of potentially 
relevant critical thinking skills (as captured by the 28-item CTQ in particular) was not 
possible.   
Because volunteers comprised the entire sample, it is important to consider the 
possible impact of self-selection bias on results, which would limit generalizability.  
Specifically, participants who chose to complete the survey (versus non-responders) 
may have felt more strongly or confidently about certain topics covered by 
questionnaire items (e.g., stronger beliefs about or preferences for or against evidence-
based interventions, intuitive clinical judgment, the perceived importance of critical 
thinking in clinical contexts, etc.).  Psychologists with stronger scientific leanings, for 
instance, may have been more willing to participate in a research study.  Of note, an 
examination of central tendency and distribution characteristics did not reveal 
substantially skewed results for questionnaire scores, although the mean REI total 
score was slightly negatively skewed (M = 32, SD = 6.3), indicating a slightly 
disproportionate preference for intuitive clinical decision-making among respondents.  
Returning for a moment to the observation that predominantly older psychologists in 
private or independent practice with 10 or more years of post-graduate clinical 
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experience submitted completed surveys, it is possible that these individuals felt that 
survey content was more professionally salient or relevant for them, and/or perhaps 
they had more time and professional flexibility to complete the surveys compared to 
other psychologists (e.g., younger early-to-mid-career psychologists in other 
professional settings).  Thus, the results of this dissertation may under-represent the 
belief profiles of younger (e.g., < 50 years of age) psychologists with 10 or fewer 
years of clinical service in non-private practice career settings.  Future alternative 
sampling methodologies (e.g., stratified sampling or possibly cluster sampling from 
randomly selected hospitals, community health centers, and university clinical 
psychology departments) may assist with clarifying statistical relationships within a 
more demographically and professionally diverse group of clinical practitioners. 
A noteworthy statistical concern within this study was the use of regression 
imputation to address NF responses (15% of all CAKQ data collected), which were 
treated as missing data.  First, on a general note, regression imputation suffers from 
the shortcomings of overestimating correlations and underestimating variances (Little 
& Rubin, 1987), which may have biased study results.  Multiple imputation (MI), 
however, is considered less biased than regression and mean imputation, in part due to 
the introduction of random noise into computation procedures (Allison, 2003).  
However, MI is not without its challenges.  It is a broad and highly technical approach 
to missing data requiring specialized software, and disagreements exist about how 
many imputations are necessary under which circumstances, with suggestions ranging 
from 2 to 510 imputations for obtaining “good” statistical results (Graham, Olchowski, 
& Gilreath, 2007; Hershberger & Fisher, 2003). 
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Second, on a conceptual note, NF responses are inherently ambiguous in the 
sense that they are qualitatively different from agreeing with, disagreeing with, or 
taking a neutral position on a knowledge claim.  The NF response option might be 
used, for example, by an intellectually cautious practitioner with rigorous clinical 
science training who may have knowledge about a particular intervention, but may not 
be comfortable responding in a perceived definitive manner.  However, this same 
response may be liberally utilized by a less scientifically conscientious practitioner 
who fails to keep abreast of relevant clinical research literature.  Thus, an optimal 
approach to analyzing NF responses is not readily apparent (especially without having 
respondents indicate their basis for selecting this response option), which is partly why 
they were treated as missing data for the current study. 
Possible avenues for future scholarly inquiry may include questions such as the 
following:  How might educators in the field of clinical psychology assist practitioners 
in developing and maintaining a professional attitude of skeptical open-mindedness 
toward known, typically used, and newly encountered approaches to assessment and 
treatment?  With regard to ethical self-monitoring strategies, how might practitioners 
identify and attenuate personal biases and tendencies to yield to emotionally 
compelling and/or seemingly plausible clinical approaches in the face of conflicting 
evidence for their value?  And more generally, what role might future psycho-
educational strategies play in increasing adherence to the more effective appraisal 
systems science offers (e.g., deference to the current state of the evidence insofar as 
the peer-reviewed research literature reveals) given our well-known cognitive 
limitations when left to our own devices (e.g., the pervasive limitations of “gut-level” 
 93 
 
intuition when faced with complex and/or high-stakes clinical decisions affecting 
vulnerable clients [Dawes, 1994])?  
Future research might also examine the presence and extent of clinicians’ 
cognitive discipline during specially designed decision making tasks (e.g., degree of 
willingness to defer to research evidence over emotional convictions) as well as 
endorsed degrees of openness and imperviousness to evidence contrary to personally 
preferred or default modes of assessment and treatment.  Given the many known 
human shortcomings in appraising evidence (Hastie & Dawes, 2010), reinforcement of 
the scientific method in clinical decision making in tandem with the capacity for 
informed recognition and rejection of largely ineffective clinical methodologies 
becomes a critical prophylactic in a field that continues to impact the lives of many 
individuals. 
 The current study has underscored the importance of continuing to study 
individual clinical practitioners’ cognitive styles and characteristics, which appear to 
be underemphasized in the extant literature.  As discussed earlier, a sanitized 
conceptual divorce of pseudoscientific content from the actions of individuals (which 
are in turn associated with cognitive and emotional styles, convictions, and 
proclivities) may not be a productive emphasis.  The author respectfully disagrees, for 
example, with the apparently common position, which is observed even among stellar 
scholars in the field (e.g., McNally, 2003; Tolin, 2013, May 28), that the antidote to 
“bad science” is simply conducting more “good science.”  This move debatably courts 
the aforementioned compartmentalization strategy by predominantly emphasizing 
content dissemination.  Its limitations may become more apparent by drawing the 
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following analogy:  If drug company A knowingly produces a pill repeatedly verified 
to be inert at best or harmful at worst (i.e., “bad pills”), all the while steadfastly 
maintaining that their pills work despite mutually incompatible evidence, is the 
appropriate sole response of the neighboring drug company B to continue mass 
producing pills repeatedly demonstrated to be effective (i.e., “good pills”)?  Although 
no one would disagree that good pills should continue to be improved upon and 
appropriately disseminated, it seems difficult to ignore the pernicious influence of 
drug company A, whose disseminative reach and public impact may not necessarily be 
checked by the circumscribed responsible actions of company B.  In addition, framing 
this complex problem as a mere horserace between “bad science” and “good science” 
(or “good” or “bad” psychotherapy, assessment, pharmacotherapy, etc.) ignores the 
cognitive, emotional, and motivational machinery associated with the ongoing 
aggressive propagation of pseudoscience. 
Bringing this analogy back to the present example of the ethical design, 
research, justification, practice, and eventual broad implementation of effective 
psychotherapy, it is unlikely that well-meaning, “good scientists” who conduct 
methodologically sound research in earnest (e.g., in Ivory Tower academia) will 
necessarily single-handedly deter or mitigate the influence of pseudoscience in society 
at large.  In fact, despite the presence of excellent quality research and the availability 
of efficacious and effective treatments, pseudoscience has remained remarkably 
pervasive and popular in the public spheres (Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2003; 
Lilienfeld, Ruscio, & Lynn, 2008).  It is here that the imposition of sanctions, despite 
the infrequency with which it is mentioned, would seem to merit careful consideration.  
 95 
 
That is, should licensing boards and/or professional organizations such as the APA 
formally reprimand (or, in cases involving certain categories of legal damages, 
potentially withdraw licensure from) clinical practitioners who persist in using known 
pseudoscientific interventions demonstrated to be ineffective or harmful (e.g., see 
Lohr & Fowler, 2002, summer; Lowman, 2012)? 
Other possible steps for combating the prevalence and influence of 
pseudoscience among applied psychologists include the following: (a) revamping and 
possibly standardizing current clinical psychology graduate-level curricula to include 
formal training in clinical versus actuarial judgment, cognitive biases relevant to 
clinical decision making, philosophy of science considerations (e.g., distinguishing 
scientific from unscientific approaches), and applied psychometrics in assessment; (b) 
developing lists of “psychotherapies to avoid” (p. 8) based on evaluative criteria 
consistently applied to treatment studies, which would be similar to existing lists of 
ESTs (Chambless & Hollon, 1998; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001); (c) organizing 
pseudoscience watchdog groups to respond to popular self-help material and 
outlandish claims in the media with the help of professional psychological 
organizations; and (d) setting more rigorous standards for continuing education (CE) 
credit courses necessary for maintaining licensure (Lilienfeld, 1998, fall; Lilienfeld, 
2010; Lohr & Fowler, 2002, summer; McFall, 1991).  With regard to point “a” above, 
some psychologists (e.g., McFall, 1991) have argued that rote acquisition of facts has 
lamentably displaced learning core principles of scientific thinking in clinical 
psychology programs, and the APA has been loath to address this problem for far too 
long.  Lohr and Fowler (2002, summer) went so far as to suggest that the APA (and 
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other accrediting bodies) should actively refuse to accredit clinical graduate programs 
that fail to adhere to a more rigorous academic curriculum emphasizing critical 
thinking skills and applied knowledge domains imperative to ethical practice.  On a 
similar note, Lilienfeld (2010) decried the unchecked freedom of clinical psychology 
departments to implement whatever training program philosophy and emphasis they 
see fit with impunity, calling this decisional latitude “a grievous error” (p. 286).   
However, it is also important to recognize limitations introduced by the 
distance between didactic and associated practical applications (e.g., clear behavioral 
modeling of core principles with subsequent practice opportunities combined with 
corrective feedback).  For example, a survey of 653 clinical psychology graduate 
students from 169 U.S. doctoral programs indicated that although 60% of participants 
reported receiving satisfactory training in integrating science and practice (within a 
scientist-practitioner training model), approximately one-third of the sample 
acknowledged a disconnect between scientific knowledge learned in graduate school 
and their applied clinical behaviors later in their careers (VanderVeen, Reddy, 
Veilleux, January, & DiLillo, 2012).  Thus, as emphasized by recent research (viz., 
Berenbaum & Shoham, 2011; Kaslow et al., 2004), standardizing and streamlining 
graduate curricula in line with the scientific literature may best be combined with an 
emphasis on supervised demonstrations of effective practical clinical applications of 
knowledge gleaned from research.  This applied educational strategy may assist with 
improving the quality of early professionals’ clinical training, which in turn may help 
check the influence of pseudoscience.  Additionally, user-friendly treatment evaluation 
tools, such as the “Therapy Rating Scale” proposed by Worrall (1990) for parents and 
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educators of children with learning disabilities, may be developed and tailored to assist 
clinicians with vetting novel treatments that pique their interest.  Combined with the 
more rigorous educational training suggestions noted above, the dissemination of 
ready-to-use intervention evaluation tools (e.g., worksheets enumerating “full-stop” 
and “warning flag” criteria associated with specific treatment package features) among 
practitioners may help reinforce sorely needed applied critical thinking skills as well 
as diminish the influence of pseudoscience in applied practice. 
 Finally, on the front lines of actively practicing clinicians, making better use of 
available computer software to enhance the quality and ubiquity of helpful treatment 
outcome feedback is encouraged.  For example, a fairly recent online psychotherapy 
outcome tracking program, the Systemic Therapy Inventory of Change (STIC), 
assesses and tracks both client progress and therapeutic alliance factors (Pinsof, 
Goldsmith, & Latta, 2012).  Programs like STIC could be utilized more broadly in 
applied practice settings to furnish readily available clinical outcome data in a 
systematized and time efficient manner.  The provision of on-demand, analyzed, and 
compactly summarized individual client data (e.g., using graphical software) to 
clinicians each session may greatly improve treatment planning, client-therapist 
collaboration, and clinician accountability beyond what is gleaned from intuitive 
impressions of how clients are faring psychologically. 
In closing, most people, including highly educated clinical psychologists, 
harbor misguided beliefs to various degrees.  The objective of this project was not to 
ridicule, demonize, or ostracize psychologists who display erroneous clinical 
convictions and/or suboptimal critical thinking skills.  Rather, the objective was to 
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assist with beginning to uncover possible variables that lead to misguided beliefs and 
attitudes among those providing professional care to psychologically vulnerable (and 
often disempowered) people who place their trust in the contemporary mental health 
care system.  It is clear that these beliefs do not exist in a vacuum or in a strictly 
academic context; rather, they are rife in a profession where their influences may 
adversely impact clients’ lives.  Uncovering the variables undergirding 
pseudoscientific beliefs and proclivities may aid in the creation of future psycho-
educational strategies for clinical psychologists, which may mitigate negative 
influences in a professional climate demanding accountability, ethical treatment, and 
professional responsibility. 
As we are reminded by David Hume (1748/2007), and more contemporarily, 
Carl Sagan (1995), extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.  Although 
clinical psychology requires a delicate balance of skepticism and open-mindedness 
like any other scientific endeavor (Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2003), we must not, as 
space journalist James E. Oberg once quipped, remain so open-minded that our 
“brains fall out” in the process (Sagan & Druyan, 1997).  However, as eloquently 
articulated by the late Richard Feynman (1998), “…in life, in gaiety, in emotion, in 
human pleasures and pursuits, and in literature and so on, there is no need to be 
scientific” (p. 2).  That is, one need not rigidly adhere to an all-pervasive, lockstep 
scientism across all facets of life, which would be nonsensical in many contexts (e.g., 
deciding which music to enjoy or which books to read for pleasure).  Science can 
guide our efforts in constructing a laser and prolonging longevity, but as Hume’s 
guillotine reminds us, it cannot necessarily tell us where we ought to aim the laser or 
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under what circumstances we ought to postpone death (Leahey & Leahey, 1983).  It 
likewise would be inappropriate and overly stilted to allow scientific concerns to 
dictate every therapeutic micro-movement and interaction occurring within the walls 
of clinicians’ offices.  As metaphorically illustrated by the Yerkes-Dodson law and 
other U-shaped functions (e.g., Seery, 2011), an Aristotelian balance between excess 
(fanatical scientism) and deficiency (postmodernist rejection of science) may suffice 
in working toward a broader implementation of ethically responsible and humane 
clinical care.  In keeping with Alan Blinder’s (1987) wise admonition, here’s to the 
cultivation of hard heads and soft hearts in clinical psychology17. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1 The subtitle of this section is a tribute to the title of Alan F. Chalmers’ (1999) 
classic text on the monumental efforts of eminent philosophers of science to formulate 
generalized definitions of science, which have often fallen short (e.g., the problems of 
naïve falsificationism). 
2 For example, in the early 1990s, a typical graduate school applicant was four 
times more likely to be accepted into a clinical Psy.D. program without tuition 
remission (compared to a clinical Ph.D. program), and students were enrolling in 
practitioner-oriented programs at a rate of nearly three times higher than enrollment 
rates in scientist-practitioner programs (Norcross, Hanych, & Terranova, 1996).  As of 
2010, the ratio of enrolled students to total number of applications submitted to APA-
accredited Ph.D. programs in the U.S. was 5% compared to 18% for accredited Psy.D. 
programs (Kohout & Wicherski, 2010, October). 
3 Of note, use of placebo comparison groups in psychotherapy research testing 
novel treatments is arguably neglectful of participants in certain contexts.  For 
example, if existing treatments are already known to exceed the effects of placebo, 
then those interventions (TAUs) may best serve as the comparison group in place of 
the placebo.  This reasoning is consistent with the Edinburgh Revision to the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki (see World Medical Association, 2013). 
 4 Identification of scientifically plausible mechanisms of change embedded in 
treatment packages (e.g., specific treatment components directly responsible for 
allaying distress) is another invaluable contribution of clinical science (Laurenceau et 
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al., 2007).  Although an inability to isolate individual change mechanisms does not 
preclude using interventions otherwise shown to work, as has been the case with many 
psychopharmacological agents, this process may ultimately help protect against the 
undue crediting of non-specific treatment effects in many cases (Baker et al., 2008; 
Beyerstein, 1997). 
 5 Beyerstein (1997) appeared to consider “statistical significance” sufficient in 
this context, but it goes without saying that other important quantitative information 
(e.g., effect sizes, confidence intervals, and statistical power considerations) weighs 
heavily on the multifaceted problem of “meaningful” differences.  Moreover, a litany 
of both logical (e.g., invalid application of modus tollens to probabilistic conditions 
via modal “rejection” or “failure to reject” a null hypothesis) and statistical (e.g., 
instances of insufficient power to detect genuine differences or over-sensitive designs 
whose results are interpreted as genuine effects without regard to effect sizes) 
problems have plagued null hypothesis significance testing (often abbreviated NHST) 
since its inception, which beclouds popularly discussed notions of theory confirmation 
and disconfirmation (e.g., the glaring disconnect between NHST results and 
pinpointing specific problems with theories).  It is beyond the scope of this project to 
discuss these complex issues in detail; the interested reader is advised to consult 
Harlow, Mulaik, and Steiger (1997) as well as Morrison and Henkel (2009) for a more 
thorough overview of the problem. 
6 Pseudoscience typically has been differentiated from other questionable 
forms of non-science in the extant literature.  For example, “junk science” (see Edens 
et al., 2012; Huber, 1993) usually refers to dubious expert witness claims 
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masquerading as informed scientific opinion in courtrooms, which is usually at odds 
with legal rules of evidence (e.g., Frye or Daubert standards depending on the state; 
Faigman & Monahan, 2009).  “Quackery,” on the other hand, has been defined by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration as “the commercialization of unproven, often 
worthless, and sometimes dangerous health products and procedures” (Young, 1988, 
p. 12). 
7 An illustrative example of dismantling in the field of ethnobotany can be 
found in Wade Davis’ (1985) popular book (and later, Hollywood horror film) The 
Serpent and the Rainbow.  In this book, Davis detailed his infiltration into Haitian 
voodoo secret societies to research an allegedly magical and nefarious “zombi 
powder” used by local sorcerers to exact revenge on enemies.  When ingested in food 
or drink, the powder supposedly caused people to die and return from the grave as 
zombies, to which local Haitian village habitants attested.  However, upon further 
scrutiny, Davis (1983) discovered that the voodoo sorcerer’s concoction contained a 
potent neurotoxin found in puffer fish called tetrodotoxin (TTX), which is known to 
cause a form of flaccid paralysis that gives the temporary appearance of death.  Thus, 
although the superstitious zombification claim was debunked, Davis’ (1983) 
component analysis (or “dismantling”) style logic was noteworthy, for he 
demonstrated that the TTX alone (and not the human bone powder, tarantula innards, 
herbs, jimson weed, voodoo incantations whispered over the powder, etc.) was 
responsible for the observed temporary paralysis mistaken for death. 
8 Some studies indicate that clinical experience sometimes may be negatively 
related to judgment accuracy.  For example a study by Hermann and colleagues 
 103 
 
(1999), found that older psychiatrists with more years of clinical experience adhered to 
outdated knowledge about electroconvulsive therapy and were unaware of updated 
research on this subject. 
9 Mathematician Morris Kline’s (1967) apt summary statement definitely 
applies here, viz., “human nature is a more complicated structure than a mass sliding 
down an inclined plane or a bob vibrating on a spring” (p. 499).  Much of 
psychological research relies on intangible theoretical concepts inferred through 
quantification procedures yielding latent constructs or latent variables (or, in 
statistical terms, linear composites; for detailed statistical treatments, see Bentler, 
1980; Bollen, 2002; and Loehlin, 2004).  Latent variables remain widely accepted in 
contemporary psychological research and are ubiquitous across theories and 
explanatory frameworks (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003).  Reification 
fallacies notwithstanding, these unobservable constructs (e.g., personality 
features/types, cognitive abilities, and emotional states) are typically viewed as giving 
rise to (or, in the author’s diverging opinion, are numerical Platonic summary 
statements of) conglomerates of observable and measurable behaviors (e.g., social 
proximity), test scores (e.g., IQ scores), and patterns of physical arousal (e.g., 
physiological indicators such as blood pressure elevation).  In the context of classical 
test theory, the unobserved value of a latent variable under a given set of 
circumstances is the true score, which we attempt to mathematically approximate as 
best we can despite the inevitability of varying degrees of distortion attributable to 
measurement error (cf. DeVellis, 2003, p. 15).  Complicating matters further, invoking 
a scientific realist interpretation of factor analytic results, which some researchers 
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mistakenly do, we cannot declare with certainty that factors (or any of its constituent 
indicators, for that matter) share clean, isomorphic correspondences with their 
counterparts in reality, especially given the fragmentary, intangible, and uncontained 
nature of those counterparts (e.g., the diagnostic construct of depression as a finely 
fragmented array of various self-reported symptoms and observed behavioral signs). 
10 Additional complicating factors include the difficulties often involved in 
reaching accurate conclusions as information at hand becomes increasingly complex 
and ambiguous, the salience and emotional seductiveness of privileging direct 
experience over more abstract research findings, and general human cognitive 
limitations.  Given these considerations, erroneous conclusions, nonscientific leanings, 
and false beliefs arguably may be far more ubiquitous and influential than formally 
recognized by many psychologists (including Lilienfeld et al., 2003), perhaps even 
among those who otherwise perceive themselves as hardcore rationalists or scientists.  
Roughly speaking, clinicians are not exempt from being influenced by their own 
evolutionarily-shaped neurobiological wiring programmed to respond to immediate or 
near-immediate environmental circumstances with snap judgments.  This reasoning is 
important to consider when one is tempted to attribute the false or otherwise 
unorthodox beliefs of clinicians to poor moral character and/or easily remedied 
“irrationality,” which may contribute to unjustifiably hasty and damaging 
characterological generalizations. 
11 Note that this terminology is superficially misleading.  That is, MAR does 
not refer to haphazardly missing data.  Rather, it refers to the presence of a systematic 
relationship between the likelihood of missing values (on Y) and other variables (X) in 
 105 
 
a given dataset.  In contrast, MCAR refers to the absence of a relationship between 
other variables and the probability of missing data on Y, which is closest to 
haphazardly missing data.  Another missing data mechanism, termed missing not at 
random (MNAR), accounts for situations in which missing Y values are associated 
with Y values after controlling for the influence of other variables in a dataset (e.g., a 
disproportionate number of missing job performance ratings for workers who were 
fired for unacceptably low work performance after controlling for potential confounds, 
such as IQ) (Enders, 2010, pp. 5–8).  Similar to MAR, there is no acknowledgement in 
the quantitative research literature of any formal evaluation procedure for clearly 
judging whether missing data are NMAR, and MNAR models (e.g., selection and 
pattern mixture models) rely on far more restrictive and generally untenable 
assumptions than MAR models (e.g., distribution assumptions that cannot be tested 
and controversial parameter estimation practices) (see Allison, 2002; Enders, 2010; 
Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
12 Of note, categorical data imputation was not conducted. 
13 These particular independent variables were chosen based on perceived 
plausibility of accounting for variance in NF responses.  For example, it is conceivable 
that practitioners with different theoretical orientation preferences, professional 
degrees/concentrations, and years of practice may have evidenced unique NF patterns. 
14 Although not as quantitatively sophisticated as multiple imputation and 
maximum likelihood procedures, standard regression imputation is similar to these 
procedures in that it gleans information from non-missing data using complete-case 
analysis to construct regression equations used to impute missing values.  It is 
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generally considered superior to mean substitution techniques (e.g., milder covariance 
attenuation), although correlations and multiple R values tend to be overestimated 
(Enders, 2010; Olinsky, Chen, & Harlow, 2003). 
15 A comparison of results from imputed and non-imputed CAKQ data was 
omitted because the standard default approach to missing data (viz., the complete case 
or listwise approach) would have yielded misleading results (i.e., the sample size 
would have been drastically reduced from 324 to 59 participants, resulting in a 
substantial loss of statistical power). 
16 Choosing between the terms “knowledge” and “belief” in this context is 
challenging, and one or the other term may not precisely characterize all CAKQ 
responses.  This may depend in part on the specific wording of individual items, and it 
may also depend on idiographic characteristics of respondents, which become 
obfuscated with nomothetic analyses.  Using the word “belief” in isolation is arguably 
an emotive and misleading term to some degree, invoking parallels to questions of 
“belief” in such things as the afterlife or the existence of life on other planets.  Beliefs, 
of course, may be deemed warranted or unwarranted depending on the existence and 
nature of evidence bearing upon such questions.  The purpose of developing the 
CAKQ was to detect practitioners’ familiarity with or knowledge of the current 
clinical literature, and many of the questions were explicitly worded to that end, for 
example, “Most scientific studies indicate that…” and “There is little to no scientific 
evidence that…”   
On an idiographic level, there is no strict functional behavioral difference 
between clinician A, who does aromatherapy for OCD and has only a vague (or 
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possibly mistaken) idea about exposure and response prevention (ExRP) and its 
effectiveness, and clinician B, who knows precisely what ExRP is (and knows that the 
research shows it to be efficacious and effective for OCD, especially in conjunction 
with Luvox), yet administers aromatherapy for OCD regardless.  However, if clinician 
A strongly disagreed with a statement about the effectiveness of ExRP for OCD 
framed as “Scientific research shows…,” then this response would not consist of pure 
belief at work—it would be undergirded by an ignorance of the relevant literature.  If 
clinician B were to strongly disagree with the same statement, however, this would 
indicate a more belief-infused denial of the data as opposed to ignorance of the 
research. 
17 A “hard-head, soft-heart” (cf. Blinder, 1987) approach to psychotherapy 
might draw from “science-informed humanism” (Allen, 2013, spring), which 
emphasizes both specific (e.g., evidence-based treatment components) and non-
specific (e.g., empathy and therapeutic alliance) factors shown to be effective in 
treating psychopathology (Allen, 2013, spring; Bracken et al., 2012).  This idea is 
compatible with Peterson’s (2000) concept of the scientific practitioner, although his 
admonition should be kept in mind: “Those who glorify the artistic aspects of clinical 
experience and resist scientific advances lead us astray” (p. 252). 
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Table 1 
 
Demographic and Professional Characteristics of Participants (N = 324) 
 
Characteristic n % 
Age (years)   
 30–40 53 16 
 41–50 62 19 
 51–60 66 21 
 61–70 118 36 
 71–80 21 6 
 81–90 2 <1 
 91–99 1 <1 
Sex   
 Female 189 58 
 Male 134 41 
 (Missing data) 1 <1 
Race   
 White or Caucasian 307 95 
 (Missing data) 6 2 
 Asian 5 1 
 Black or African American 3 <1 
 American Indian or Alaskan Native 3 <1 
Highest degree earned   
 Ph.D. 223 69 
 Psy.D. 78 24 
 Ed.D. 22 7 
 D.Min. 1 <1 
Degree field   
 Clinical psychology 253 78 
 Counseling psychology 47 15 
 School psychology 13 4 
 Educational psychology 5 2 
 Neuropsychology 3 1 
 Experimental psychology 1 <1 
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 Religion and psychological studies 1 <1 
 Other psychology 1 <1 
State of psychology licensure   
 Massachusetts 135 42 
 Connecticut 63 19 
 Rhode Island 51 16 
 Vermont 31 9 
 New Hampshire 25 8 
 Maine 19 6 
Theoretical orientation   
 Cognitive-behavioral 135 42 
 Psychodynamic 68 21 
 Eclectic or integrative 35 11 
 Interpersonal 34 11 
 Systems or family 16 5 
 Humanistic 10 3 
 Strict behavioral or ABA 5 2 
 (Missing data) 5 2 
 Acceptance and commitment 4 1 
 Existential 3 1 
 Rational-emotive 2 <1 
 Feminist 2 <1 
Clinical setting   
 Private or independent practice 219 68 
 Hospital 25 8 
 University or four-year college 21 7 
 Other health service setting 15 5 
 Elementary or secondary school 14 4 
 Community health center 13 4 
 Government or VA medical center 9 3 
 Medical school 5 1 
 Correctional setting 2 <1 
 Other academic or research setting 1 <1 
Hours of weekly clinical service   
 1–10  50 15 
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 11–20 85 26 
 21–30 104 32 
 31–40 71 22 
 41–50 12 4 
 51–100 2 <1 
Years of clinical service   
 1–10 56 17 
 11–20 101 31 
 21–30 89 27 
 31–40 67 21 
 41–50 9 3 
 51–100 2 <1 
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Table 2 
 
Clinical Attitudes and Knowledge Questionnaire Item Responses 
 
Item (Mean and Standard Deviation) and Response (N = 324) n % 
1. Science certainly has its strong points, but its potential advantages over other 
methods for acquiring knowledge are often exaggerated or overperceived. (M = 
2.06; SD = 1.22) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 1 <1 
1 = Strongly Disagree 140 43 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 97 30 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 23 7 
4 = Somewhat Agree 50 15 
5 = Strongly Agree 13 4 
   
2. Practicing clinicians do not usually develop high levels of insight into their 
clinical judgmental processes. (M = 2.13; SD = 1.16) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 6 2 
1 = Strongly Disagree 104 32 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 125 39 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 29 9 
4 = Somewhat Agree 51 16 
5 = Strongly Agree 9 3 
   
3. The majority of people who were sexually abused during childhood do not go 
on to develop severe personality disorders in adulthood. (M = 3.89; SD = 5.46) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 12 4 
1 = Strongly Disagree 11 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 44 14 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 46 14 
4 = Somewhat Agree 126 39 
5 = Strongly Agree 84 26 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
4. Empirically supported therapies rarely generalize to real-world settings. (M = 
2.09; SD = 1.05) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 2 <1 
1 = Strongly Disagree 102 32 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 133 41 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 44 14 
4 = Somewhat Agree 37 11 
5 = Strongly Agree 6 2 
   
5. Psychological research has discredited the idea that human memory works 
like a video or tape recorder (e.g., that the brain is capable of near-perfect 
retention of the details of past events). (M = 4.60; SD = 7.59) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 21 7 
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1 = Strongly Disagree 8 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 23 7 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 16 5 
4 = Somewhat Agree 81 25 
5 = Strongly Agree 173 53 
Missing Data 2 <1 
   
6. Family therapy (e.g., the Maudsley model) is largely ineffective for treating 
anorexia nervosa. (M = 1.22; SD = 1.27) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 144 44 
1 = Strongly Disagree 40 12 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 78 24 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 53 16 
4 = Somewhat Agree 6 2 
5 = Strongly Agree 3 1 
   
7. Acupuncture reduces symptoms of anxiety and depression by stimulating the 
flow of “qi” (energy) through bodily meridians. (M = 2.09; SD = 1.75) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 110 34 
1 = Strongly Disagree 25 8 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 22 7 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 78 24 
4 = Somewhat Agree 70 22 
5 = Strongly Agree 19 6 
   
8. Nearly all clients who commit suicide have severe clinical depression. (M = 
2.73; SD = 1.32) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 9 3 
1 = Strongly Disagree 46 14 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 116 36 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 35 11 
4 = Somewhat Agree 89 28 
5 = Strongly Agree 29 9 
   
9. Hypnosis is not an effective tool for the accurate recovery of repressed 
memories (e.g., of past physical or sexual abuse). (M = 3.18; SD = 1.64) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 41 13 
1 = Strongly Disagree 9 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 58 18 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 41 13 
4 = Somewhat Agree 94 29 
5 = Strongly Agree 81 25 
   
10. Psychotherapists may unknowingly mislead clients into integrating 
completely fabricated events (i.e., false memories) into their personal histories. 
(M = 3.83; SD = 1.10) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 8 3 
1 = Strongly Disagree 6 2 
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2 = Somewhat Disagree 23 7 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 41 13 
4 = Somewhat Agree 164 51 
5 = Strongly Agree 82 25 
   
11. Psychological research has established cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) 
as an efficacious intervention for social anxiety disorder. (M = 4.40; SD = 1.01) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 6 2 
1 = Strongly Disagree 8 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 3 1 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 8 3 
4 = Somewhat Agree 108 33 
5 = Strongly Agree 191 59 
   
12. Directing most of one’s attention to a client’s uniqueness when making 
clinical predictions almost invariably decreases the overall level of judgmental 
accuracy. (M = 3.36; SD = 9.36) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 38 12 
1 = Strongly Disagree 41 13 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 76 24 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 81 25 
4 = Somewhat Agree 69 21 
5 = Strongly Agree 16 5 
Missing Data 3 1 
   
13. Past life regression is useful for identifying clients’ traumatic memories prior 
to their birth. (M = 1.14; SD = .94) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 57 18 
1 = Strongly Disagree 211 65 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 24 7 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 20 6 
4 = Somewhat Agree 9 3 
5 = Strongly Agree 3 1 
   
14. A large body of scientific research shows that clinical judgment is rarely 
superior to actuarial (or statistical) judgment methods in predicting outcomes 
(e.g., determining whether a client has a major depression, or whether someone 
will act violently). (M = 3.42; SD = 7.70) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 35 11 
1 = Strongly Disagree 29 9 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 73 23 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 56 17 
4 = Somewhat Agree 79 24 
5 = Strongly Agree 50 15 
Missing Data 2 <1 
   
15. Exposure-based interventions are not scientifically supported for treating 
post-traumatic stress disorder. (M = 2.08; SD = 5.56) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 43 13 
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1 = Strongly Disagree 113 35 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 97 30 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 24 7 
4 = Somewhat Agree 33 10 
5 = Strongly Agree 13 4 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
16. The bilateral desensitization component (e.g., moving finger or light) of Eye 
Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy effectively 
alleviates symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (M = 3.17; SD = 
5.59) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 52 16 
1 = Strongly Disagree 27 8 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 38 12 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 39 12 
4 = Somewhat Agree 127 39 
5 = Strongly Agree 40 12 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
17. Most scientific studies indicate that dreams accurately reflect unconscious 
autobiographical memories. (M = 1.56; SD = 1.09) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 50 15 
1 = Strongly Disagree 115 36 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 108 33 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 32 10 
4 = Somewhat Agree 15 5 
5 = Strongly Agree 4 1 
   
18. Exposure plus response prevention (ERP) is an effective psychological 
treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). (M = 4.06; SD = 5.56) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 44 14 
1 = Strongly Disagree 3 1 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 12 4 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 19 6 
4 = Somewhat Agree 92 28 
5 = Strongly Agree 153 48 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
19. There is little to no scientific evidence that neurolinguistic programming 
methods rapidly eliminate symptoms of specific phobias. (M = 1.48; SD = 1.86) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 187 58 
1 = Strongly Disagree 3 1 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 23 7 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 46 14 
4 = Somewhat Agree 34 11 
5 = Strongly Agree 30 10 
   
20. The vast majority of clients diagnosed with DID have extensively 
corroborated histories of severe child abuse. (M = 3.67; SD = 9.41) 
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NF = Not Familiar 77 24 
1 = Strongly Disagree 15 5 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 25 8 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 45 14 
4 = Somewhat Agree 102 32 
5 = Strongly Agree 57 18 
Missing Data 3 1 
   
21. Language and social skill deficits associated with autism can be treated 
effectively with early intensive behavioral intervention (EIBI; the Lovaas 
method). (M = 2.54; SD = 1.91) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 101 31 
1 = Strongly Disagree 11 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 20 6 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 32 10 
4 = Somewhat Agree 124 38 
5 = Strongly Agree 36 11 
   
22. Most, if not all, major psychopathology ultimately has its roots in low self-
esteem. (M = 2.12; SD = 5.50) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 4 1 
1 = Strongly Disagree 158 49 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 87 27 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 44 14 
4 = Somewhat Agree 26 8 
5 = Strongly Agree 4 1 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
23. Tapping specific points on the body while thinking about a distressing 
problem — a component of Thought Field Therapy (TFT) — is not a well-
supported intervention. (M = 2.10; SD = 5.74) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 159 49 
1 = Strongly Disagree 4 1 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 31 10 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 42 13 
4 = Somewhat Agree 44 14 
5 = Strongly Agree 43 13 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
24. Clinical judgments and predictions of people’s behaviors are often not much 
better than chance. (M = 2.78; SD = 1.32) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 9 3 
1 = Strongly Disagree 49 15 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 99 31 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 37 11 
4 = Somewhat Agree 106 33 
5 = Strongly Agree 24 7 
   
 116 
 
25. Scientific research has refuted the notion that psychiatric hospital admissions 
are at their peak during full moons. (M = 1.99; SD = 1.88) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 133 41 
1 = Strongly Disagree 11 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 32 10 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 61 19 
4 = Somewhat Agree 49 15 
5 = Strongly Agree 38 12 
   
26. Psychological research has consistently shown that recovered memory 
techniques are not trustworthy treatment methods for unearthing repressed 
memories. (M = 3.43; SD = 1.68) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 49 15 
1 = Strongly Disagree 3 1 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 21 7 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 31 10 
4 = Somewhat Agree 128 40 
5 = Strongly Agree 92 28 
   
27. Vaccines contain toxins that may cause autism in young children. (M = 1.65; 
SD = 5.49) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 17 5 
1 = Strongly Disagree 228 70 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 42 13 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 21 7 
4 = Somewhat Agree 14 4 
5 = Strongly Agree 1 <1 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
28. Attending to complex patterns and interrelationships among variables in 
clinical psychological test data is usually unnecessary for increasing the overall 
accuracy of clinical judgments. (M = 2.10; SD = 5.51) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 20 6 
1 = Strongly Disagree 128 40 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 116 36 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 25 8 
4 = Somewhat Agree 25 8 
5 = Strongly Agree 9 3 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
29. Withholding critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) from people who have 
experienced a potentially traumatic event typically has harmful consequences. 
(M = 2.60; SD = 5.62) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 69 21 
1 = Strongly Disagree 42 13 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 65 20 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 45 14 
4 = Somewhat Agree 73 23 
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5 = Strongly Agree 29 9 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
30. We should respect different methods for trying to understand the world 
because other methods often equal or exceed science for acquiring knowledge. 
(M = 3.53; SD = 7.64) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 6 2 
1 = Strongly Disagree 42 13 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 78 24 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 71 22 
4 = Somewhat Agree 89 28 
5 = Strongly Agree 36 11 
Missing Data 2 <1 
   
31. Interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT) generally is not helpful for alleviating 
symptoms of major depressive disorder. (M = 1.66; SD = 1.14) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 42 13 
1 = Strongly Disagree 112 35 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 119 37 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 23 7 
4 = Somewhat Agree 20 6 
5 = Strongly Agree 8 3 
   
32. Interoceptive exercises (e.g., deliberate shallow breathing exercises) are 
effective for treating panic symptoms. (M = 3.24; SD = 5.65) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 69 21 
1 = Strongly Disagree 23 7 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 14 4 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 33 10 
4 = Somewhat Agree 118 36 
5 = Strongly Agree 66 20 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
33. In science, quantification offers powerful advantages over other ways of 
analyzing information or predicting outcomes. (M = 3.66; SD = 5.49) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 26 8 
1 = Strongly Disagree 10 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 28 9 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 74 23 
4 = Somewhat Agree 127 39 
5 = Strongly Agree 58 18 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
34. Most of the soundest bases for knowledge in psychology rest on scientific 
studies and advances. (M = 4.24; SD = 5.38) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 0 0 
1 = Strongly Disagree 9 3 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 30 9 
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3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 35 11 
4 = Somewhat Agree 143 44 
5 = Strongly Agree 106 33 
Missing Data 1 <1 
   
35. Research has shown that Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) techniques 
reduce parasuicidal behaviors (i.e., non-suicidal self-injury) associated with 
borderline personality disorder (BPD). (M = 4.03; SD = 1.39) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 28 9 
1 = Strongly Disagree 1 <1 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 2 <1 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 16 5 
4 = Somewhat Agree 131 40 
5 = Strongly Agree 146 45 
   
36. Maximizing the accuracy of clinical judgments depends on integrating most 
or all of the available data (e.g., clinical observations, test results, interview data, 
etc.). (M = 4.58; SD = .79) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 2 <1 
1 = Strongly Disagree 1 <1 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 9 3 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 9 3 
4 = Somewhat Agree 77 24 
5 = Strongly Agree 226 70 
   
37. Much like any other way of trying to understand the world, scientific beliefs 
and conclusions are strongly, if not primarily, determined by such factors as 
culture and human biases. (M = 3.19; SD = 1.22) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 1 <1 
1 = Strongly Disagree 30 9 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 80 25 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 49 15 
4 = Somewhat Agree 125 39 
5 = Strongly Agree 39 12 
   
38. Knowledge about the base rates (i.e., prevalence) of common mental 
disorders is very useful when making clinical diagnostic decisions. (M = 3.43; 
SD = 1.19) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 0 0 
1 = Strongly Disagree 23 7 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 63 19 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 50 15 
4 = Somewhat Agree 129 40 
5 = Strongly Agree 59 18 
   
39. Research clearly indicates that the single greatest contributor to diagnostic 
and predictive accuracy in mental health is consistent adherence to one’s clinical 
experience and judgments. (M = 2.28; SD = 1.20) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 31 10 
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1 = Strongly Disagree 40 12 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 119 37 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 81 25 
4 = Somewhat Agree 46 14 
5 = Strongly Agree 7 2 
   
40. Nutritional approaches to treat ADHD symptoms lack consistent scientific 
support. (M = 2.90; SD = 1.85) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 71 22 
1 = Strongly Disagree 6 2 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 51 16 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 27 8 
4 = Somewhat Agree 94 29 
5 = Strongly Agree 75 23 
   
41. If given access to identical information, practitioners with 10 or more years 
of clinical experience will tend to make considerably more accurate diagnostic 
judgments than practitioners with only a few years of clinical experience. (M = 
2.98; SD = 5.53) 
  
NF = Not Familiar 36 11 
1 = Strongly Disagree 23 7 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 79 24 
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree 70 22 
4 = Somewhat Agree 100 31 
5 = Strongly Agree 15 5 
Missing Data 1 <1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 
 
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
 
Name of Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CAKQ Total 126.22 11.81 — –.43** –.40** –.39** .29** .27** .19** .16** 
2. REI Total 32.15 6.29  — .90** .93** –.22** –.20** –.13* –.16** 
3. REI EA 16.95 3.08   — .69** –.23** –.22** –.14* –.14* 
4. REI EE 15.16 3.76    — –.18** –.16** –.11 –.15** 
5. CTQ Total 10.33 2.25     — .70** .81** .58** 
6. CTQ Inference  1.32 1.08      — .25** .24** 
7. CTQ Interpretation 5.50 1.35       — .28** 
8. CTQ Deduction 3.51 .67        — 
 
Note.  CAKQ = Clinical Attitudes and Knowledge Questionnaire; REI = Rational-Experiential Inventory; EA = Experiential  
 
Ability; EE = Experiential Engagement; CTQ = Critical Thinking Questionnaire.  CAKQ Total Scores were computed  
 
following regression imputation.  *p < .05;  **p < .01 (two-tailed).
1
2
0
 
 121 
 
Table 4 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, Rotated Factor Loadings, and Communalities for the  
 
Rational-Experiential Inventory Items 
 
   Factor loadings  
REI Item M SD 1 2 h
2 
3 3.99 .75 .46 .07 .26 
6 3.03 .91 .58 .23 .58 
7 2.69 .94 .62 .12 .50 
8 3.21        1.01 .79        –.17 .47 
9 2.95        1.04 .59 .16 .50 
10 3.30 .93 .68 .10 .56 
1 3.32 .92 .10 .67 .56 
2 3.45 .85 .15 .64 .57 
4 3.25 .88 .02 .48 .24 
5 2.96 .88        –.06 .78 .55 
 
Note.  REI = Rational-Experiential Inventory.  Boldface indicates highest factor 
loadings.  REI item content can be found in the Appendix.  Factor 1 = Experiential 
Ability; Factor 2 = Experiential Engagement; h2 = communality. 
 
 122 
 
Table 5 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis Summary for Rational-Experiential Inventory Total 
Scores and Critical Thinking Questionnaire Subscale Scores Predicting Clinical 
Attitudes and Knowledge Questionnaire Total Scores 
 
Predictor  B SE B β 95% CI t p 
REI Total –0.71 0.10   –.38 [–0.90, –0.53] –7.48 < .001 
CTQ Inference 1.73 0.57 .16 [0.60, 2.86] 3.01 .003 
CTQ 
Interpretation 
0.77 0.46 .09    [–0.13, 1.68] 1.69 .092 
CTQ Deduction 0.77 0.92 .04 [–1.03, 2.58] 0.84 .400 
 
Note.  REI = Rational-Experiential Inventory; CTQ = Critical Thinking Questionnaire.  
R2 = .23 (N = 321, p < .001).  CI = confidence interval for B (unstandardized 
regression coefficient). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
Figure 1 
Pareto Bar Graph of “Not Familiar” Responses to Clinical Attitudes and Knowledge 
Questionnaire Items 
 
Note.  On the x-axis, the number preceding the text descriptions is the CAKQ item 
number. NLP = Neurolinguistic Programming; PS = Pseudoscience item; AN = 
Anorexia Nervosa; EBT = Evidence-Based Treatment item; DID = Dissociative 
Identity Disorder; GK = General Clinical Knowledge item; ExRP = Exposure and 
response prevention; OCD = Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; IPT = Interpersonal 
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Psychotherapy; MDD = Major Depressive Disorder; CJ = Clinical Judgment item; Act 
= Actuarial prediction; DBT = Dialectical Behavior Therapy; BPD = Borderline 
Personality Disorder; Dep = Depression; CBT = Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy; SE = 
Self-Esteem. 
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APPENDIX 
 
CLINICIAN SURVEY 
 
PART A      
 
Instructions: Please respond to the following items by checking the appropriate box or 
filling in the blank. Please do not check or write more than one answer for any item. 
 
1.  Age:  ________ 
 
2.  Sex:     Male  Female 
 
3.  Primary Language:           English  Other (please specify):  ______________ 
 
4.  Race:         American Indian/Alaskan Native             Asian  
 
          Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander         Black or African American
  
          White/Caucasian    
 
5.  Ethnicity:       Hispanic or Latino  Non-Hispanic or Latino 
 
6.  In what country were you born?   United States      Other (please specify):  _____ 
 
7.  Highest academic degree:                Ph.D.       Psy.D.       Ed.D.       Sc.D. 
 
8.  Field of highest academic degree:      Clinical psychology      Counseling psychology 
 
 School psychology            Clinical science             Educational psychology
  
 Neuropsychology 
 
9.  Year highest degree obtained:  __________ 
 
10.  Did you graduate from an APA-accredited graduate psychology program?     
 
 Yes         No 
 
11.  Did you graduate from a CACREP-accredited graduate psychology program?     
 
 Yes         No 
 
12.  How many years have you provided clinical services (post-graduation)?  ________ 
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13.  On average, about how many hours of clinical services have you provided weekly 
over the last year? ________ 
 
14.  Setting in which you conduct the highest percentage of your current clinical practice: 
 
 Private/independent practice             Medical school          University/four-year college
  
 Elementary or secondary school       Community health center      
 
 Government/VA medical center        Correctional setting          Hospital                  
  
 Other health service setting             Other academic/research setting 
 
15.  What is your primary theoretical orientation? Please check only one. 
 
 Cognitive-behavioral    Strict behavioral/ABA  Rational-emotive 
    
  Psychodynamic                  Systems/family          Interpersonal 
  
 Acceptance & Commitment      Humanistic   Existential   
 
 Other (please specify):  _____________________________ 
 
Instructions: The following items refer to various beliefs relevant to clinical psychology 
and the role of science.  Using the 5-point response scale below, please indicate your level 
of agreement or disagreement with the items by writing the appropriate number on the 
line to the right of each item.  Some of the diverse topics the items cover may be 
unfamiliar to you, in which case please write “NF” (for “Not Familiar”) on the line 
instead of a number. 
 
    1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5       or write NF 
Strongly  Somewhat            Neither               Somewhat        Strongly   
Disagree   Disagree   Agree Nor          Agree           Agree 
       Disagree 
 
1. Science certainly has its strong points, but its potential advantages over other 
methods for acquiring knowledge are often exaggerated or overperceived.  
______ (R) (SCI) 
 
2. Practicing clinicians do not usually develop high levels of insight into their 
clinical judgmental processes.  ______ (CJ) 
 
3. The majority of people who were sexually abused during childhood do not go on 
to develop severe personality disorders in adulthood.  ______ (GK) 
 
4. Empirically supported therapies rarely generalize to real-world settings.  ______ 
(R) (EBT) 
 
5. Psychological research has discredited the idea that human memory works like a 
video or tape recorder (e.g., that the brain is capable of near-perfect retention of 
the details of past events).  ______ (GK) 
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6. Family therapy (e.g., the Maudsley model) is largely ineffective for treating 
anorexia nervosa.  ______ (R) (EBT) 
 
7. Acupuncture reduces symptoms of anxiety and depression by stimulating the flow 
of “qi” (energy) through bodily meridians.  ______ (R) (PS) 
 
8. Nearly all clients who commit suicide have severe clinical depression.  ______ 
(R) (GK) 
 
9. Hypnosis is not an effective tool for the accurate recovery of repressed memories 
(e.g., of past physical or sexual abuse).  ______ (PS) 
 
10. Psychotherapists may unknowingly mislead clients into integrating completely 
fabricated events (i.e., false memories) into their personal histories.  ______ (GK) 
 
11. Psychological research has established cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) as an 
efficacious intervention for social anxiety disorder.  ______ (EBT) 
 
12. Directing most of one’s attention to a client’s uniqueness when making clinical 
predictions almost invariably decreases the overall level of judgmental accuracy.  
______ (CJ) 
 
13. Past life regression is useful for identifying clients’ traumatic memories prior to 
their birth.  ______(R) (PS) 
 
14. A large body of scientific research shows that clinical judgment is rarely superior 
to actuarial (or statistical) judgment methods in predicting outcomes (e.g., 
determining whether a client has a major depression, or whether someone will act 
violently).  ______ (CJ) 
 
15. Exposure-based interventions are not scientifically supported for treating post-
traumatic stress disorder.  ______ (R) (EBT) 
 
16. The bilateral desensitization component (e.g., moving finger or light) of Eye 
Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy effectively 
alleviates symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  ______ (R) (PS) 
 
17. Most scientific studies indicate that dreams accurately reflect unconscious 
autobiographical memories. ______ (R) (GK) 
 
18. Exposure plus response prevention (ERP) is an effective psychological treatment 
for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  ______ (EBT) 
 
19. There is little to no scientific evidence that neurolinguistic programming methods 
rapidly eliminate symptoms of specific phobias.  ______ (PS) 
 
20. The vast majority of clients diagnosed with DID have extensively corroborated 
histories of severe child abuse.  ______ (R) (GK) 
 
21. Language and social skill deficits associated with autism can be treated effectively 
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with early intensive behavioral intervention (EIBI; the Lovaas method).  ______ 
(EBT) 
 
22. Most, if not all, major psychopathology ultimately has its roots in low self-esteem.  
______ (R) (GK) 
 
23. Tapping specific points on the body while thinking about a distressing problem — 
a component of Thought Field Therapy (TFT) — is not a well-supported 
intervention.  ______ (PS) 
 
24. Clinical judgments and predictions of people’s behaviors are often not much 
better than chance.  ______ (R) (CJ) 
 
25. Scientific research has refuted the notion that psychiatric hospital admissions are 
at their peak during full moons.  ______ (GK) 
 
26. Psychological research has consistently shown that recovered memory techniques 
are not trustworthy treatment methods for unearthing repressed memories.  
______ (PS) 
 
27. Vaccines contain toxins that may cause autism in young children.  ______ (R) 
(GK) 
 
28. Attending to complex patterns and interrelationships among variables in clinical 
psychological test data is usually unnecessary for increasing the overall accuracy 
of clinical judgments.  ______ (CJ) 
 
29. Withholding critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) from people who have 
experienced a potentially traumatic event typically has harmful consequences.  
______ (R) (PS) 
 
30. We should respect different methods for trying to understand the world because 
other methods often equal or exceed science for acquiring knowledge.  ______ 
(R) (SCI) 
 
31. Interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT) generally is not helpful for alleviating 
symptoms of major depressive disorder.  ______ (R) (EBT) 
 
32. Interoceptive exercises (e.g., deliberate shallow breathing exercises) are effective 
for treating panic symptoms.  ______ (EBT) 
 
33. In science, quantification offers powerful advantages over other ways of 
analyzing information or predicting outcomes.  ______ (SCI) 
 
34. Most of the soundest bases for knowledge in psychology rest on scientific studies 
and advances.  ______ (SCI) 
 
35. Research has shown that Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) techniques reduce 
parasuicidal behaviors (i.e., non-suicidal self-injury) associated with borderline 
personality disorder (BPD).  ______ (EBT) 
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36. Maximizing the accuracy of clinical judgments depends on integrating most or all 
of the available data (e.g., clinical observations, test results, interview data, etc.).  
______ (R) (CJ) 
 
37. Much like any other way of trying to understand the world, scientific beliefs and 
conclusions are strongly, if not primarily, determined by such factors as culture 
and human biases.  ______ (R) (SCI) 
 
38. Knowledge about the base rates (i.e., prevalence) of common mental disorders is 
very useful when making clinical diagnostic decisions.  ______ (CJ) 
 
39. Research clearly indicates that the single greatest contributor to diagnostic and 
predictive accuracy in mental health is consistent adherence to one’s clinical 
experience and judgments.  ______ (R) (CJ) 
 
40. Nutritional approaches to treat ADHD symptoms lack consistent scientific 
support.  ______ (PS) 
 
41. If given access to identical information, practitioners with 10 or more years of 
clinical experience will tend to make considerably more accurate diagnostic 
judgments than practitioners with only a few years of clinical experience.  ______ 
(R) (CJ) 
 
Note.  Letters enclosed in parentheses following each item response blank were not printed on 
survey copies distributed to study participants and indicate the following:  CJ = clinical 
judgment; EBT = evidence-based treatment; GK = general knowledge; PS = pseudoscience; R 
= reverse-scored item. 
 
 
PART C 
 
Instructions: Please rate the following statements about your feelings, beliefs, and 
behaviors as they apply to your clinical practice activities using the 5-point scale below. 
Again, please write the appropriate number on the line located to the right of each item. 
 
 
        1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5 
 Definitely       Mostly      Undecided or           Mostly            Definitely 
     False        False       Equally True True                     True  
                                                             and False 
 
1. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. _____ (R) (EA) 
2. I believe in trusting my hunches. _____ (EA) 
3. I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. _____ (R) (EA) 
4. I trust my initial feelings about people. _____ (EA) 
5. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest “gut feelings” to find an answer. 
_____ (EA) 
6. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. _____ (EE) 
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7. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. _____ (EE) 
8. I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. _____ (R) (EE) 
9. I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions. _____ (R) 
(EE) 
10. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. _____ (EE) 
 
Note.  Letters enclosed in parentheses following each item response blank were not printed on 
survey copies distributed to study participants and indicate the following:  EA = Experiential 
Ability; EE = Experiential Engagement; R = reverse-scored items. 
 
 
PART D 
 
Instructions: Please complete the following questions as best you can by darkening the 
boxed letter beside the correct answer.  Remember that all responses are completely 
confidential.  Please try to complete all questions in one sitting, do not spend too much 
time on any one question, and do not use help from others or other sources.  Further 
instructions are provided for some of the exercises.  Please make sure that all answers 
are clearly marked. 
 
Exercise 1 
Imagine that disorder X occurs in one in every 1,000 people.  Imagine also there is a test to 
diagnose the disorder that always gives a positive result when a person has the disorder.  Finally, 
imagine that the test has a false positive rate of 5 percent.  This means that the test wrongly 
indicates that the disorder is present in 5 percent of the cases where the person does not have 
the disorder. 
 
1. Imagine that we choose a person randomly, administer the test, and that it yields a positive 
result (indicates that the person has the disorder).  What is the probability that the individual 
actually has the disorder, assuming that we know nothing else about the individual’s 
psychological or medical history? 
 
A <10%         B 10–30%         C 30–50%         D 50–70%         E 70–90%         F >90% 
Exercise 2 
The next exercises consist of brief paragraphs followed by several conclusions.  For these 
questions, please assume that everything in the paragraph is true.  The problem is to judge the 
whether or not each of the proposed conclusions logically follows beyond a reasonable doubt 
from the information given.  Please mark either follows or does not follow after the 
conclusion. 
 
Chris had poor posture, had very few friends, was ill at east around people, and in general was 
very unhappy.  Then, a close friend recommended that Chris visit Dr. Carll, a reputed expert on 
helping people improve their personalities.  Chris took this recommendation and, after three 
months of therapy with Dr. Carll, developed more friendships, was more at ease, and in general 
felt happier. 
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2.  Without Dr. Carll’s therapy, Chris would not have improved. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
3.  Without a friend’s advice, Chris would not have heard of Dr. Carll. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
When I go to bed at night, I usually fall asleep quite promptly.  But about twice a month, I drink 
coffee during the evening, and whenever I do, I lie awake and toss for hours. 
 
4.  My problem is mostly psychological; I expect that the coffee will keep me awake, and 
therefore it does. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
5.  On nights when I want to fall asleep promptly, I’d better not drink coffee in the evening. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
When the Journal Company, Inc. was created in 1960, it was the largest psychological journal 
company America had known up to that time.  It produced twice as many psychological journals 
as all of its domestic competitors put together.  Today, the Journal Company, Inc. produces about 
20 percent of the psychological journals that are made in this country.  
 
6.  In 1960, the Journal Company, Inc. produced not less than 66 percent of the total domestic 
output of psychological   
        journals. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
7.  Today, domestic competitors produce more than three times as many psychological 
journals as does the Journal   
        Company, Inc. 
 A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
8.  The Journal Company, Inc. produces fewer psychological journals than it did in 1960. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
Exercise 3 
In this section, each exercise consists of several statements followed by several suggested 
conclusions.  For the purposes of this study, consider the statements in each exercise as true 
without exception.  After reading the conclusions beneath the statement, please mark whether 
you think it follows or does not follow from the statement given, regardless of whether you 
believe the statement to be true or not from your own experience or knowledge. 
 
No person who thinks scientifically places any faith in the predictions of astrologers.  
Nevertheless, there are many people who rely on horoscopes provided by astrologers.  
Therefore– 
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9.  People who lack confidence in horoscopes think scientifically. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
10.  Many people do not think scientifically. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
Most persons who attempt to break their smoking habit find that it is something that they can 
accomplish only with difficulty, or cannot accomplish at all.  Nevertheless, there is a growing 
number of individuals whose strong desire to stop smoking has enabled them to break the habit 
permanently. Therefore – 
 
11.  Only smokers who strongly desire to stop smoking will succeed in doing so. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
12.  A strong desire to stop smoking helps some people to permanently break the habit. 
A Follows B Does Not Follow 
 
 
The table below summarizes data from an experiment: 
 
       Improvement No Improvement 
Treatment  200   75 
No Treatment    50   15 
 
13.  Based on these data, please rate the degree of effectiveness of the treatment on the 
following scale: 
A Not at all effective          B Somewhat effective          C Effective          D Very effective 
 
14.  If the above table were an accurate reflection of the effectiveness of an innovative new 
treatment, how likely would  
          you be to use it?  
A Would not use          B Would possibly use          C Would probably use          
 
 D Would definitely use 
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